

PHILOTHEUS AND EUGENIA

MR. SERJEANT BELLASIS



PHILOTHEUS AND EUGENIA:

DIALOGUES

BETWEEN

ERD

PAGE.

.... I

TWO ANGLICANS

ON ANGLICAN DIFFICULTIES.

BY

MR. SERJEANT BELLASIS.

—
SECOND EDITION.
—

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NOTE TO FIRST EDITION OF 1861.

series of conversations took place between two
urch of England on subjects connected with the
Memoranda of these conversations were made,
rm at the time ; and the Editor, having been
se them, has obtained permission to print some of
ollowing have been accordingly selected, out of many.
seen that one of the parties had made considerable
towards the Catholic Church, whilst the other was as yet
; both, however, were still viewing it from the Protestant
, and the result is, that the objections and explanations are
such as are singularly suited to the apprehensions of Protestants.
If PHILOTHEUS had been a Catholic, his explanations would, no
doubt, have been more complete ; but the Editor has thought it
better to leave the conversations untouched. It will be seen that
they are altogether preliminary, and relate rather to the removal
of objections and misapprehensions than to the explanation of
Catholic doctrines.

NOTE TO SECOND EDITION OF 1892.

IN its notice of Mr. Serjeant Bellasis, the *National Dictionary of Biography* states that these dialogues were "issued anonymously in 1850 ;" that "the interlocutors" were "Bellasis and his wife ;" and that he himself was "received into the Roman Catholic communion on Sept. 28, 1850." There was no issue of the dialogues till 1861, when Dolman, of New Bond Street, printed the first eleven ; the twelfth was separately and "posthumously published in 1874," and appeared also in a periodical, the *Messenger of the Sacred Heart*. The thirteenth and fourteenth are now printed for the first time. The Serjeant, it may be added, was received into the Catholic Church by Father Brownbill, S. J., on Dec. 28, 1850.

Speaking of these Dialogues he says, "The necessity of qualifying myself to explain to my wife all the conclusions at which I had been long arriving compelled me to a degree of precision which I should hardly have arrived at, if I had had no one to convince but myself."—E. B. (L.)

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THE INCARNATION.

PHILOTHEUS AND EUGENIA.

PHIL. (*to his Children*): Do you know what festival to-day is?

ANSWER: Yes; the Annunciation of the Blessed Virgin Mary.

PHIL: Do you know what happened on this day?

ANS: The Angel Gabriel announced to the Blessed Virgin Mary that Jesus Christ was to be born of her.

PHIL: Do you remember what he said to her?

ANS: Yes; "Ave Maria, gratia plena, Dominus tecum, benedicta tu in mulieribus."

PHIL: Perhaps you do not know that those words are repeated by millions upon millions of people all over the world every day of their lives.

EUG: Well, I never could see the use of that; it seems to be merely a mode of unduly elevating the Virgin Mary into an object of worship.

PHIL: The great object is to keep constantly before men's minds the great fact of the Incarnation upon which the whole of the Christian dispensation depends.

EUG: I should have thought that the *death* of Christ was the great fact of Christianity, not His Incarnation, for it is on His death that the doctrine of the atonement depends.

PHIL: That is a common notion among Protestants; and in consequence of that it is that the Incarnation is forgotten by many Protestant sects, and slighted by all.

EUG: I cannot agree with you that the Incarnation is slighted by Protestants, certainly not by the Church of

England. All believe that God the Son was born of the Virgin Mary.

PHIL: I hope they do. But you were saying that the death of Christ was the great fact of Christianity, and not His Incarnation; in this I cannot concur.

EUG: Well, explain your view.

PHIL: I will; to atone for the sins of the world, God the Son, the second person of the Holy Trinity, condescended to become man in the womb of the Blessed Virgin, to be born, to live in obscurity and poverty, to suffer hunger and thirst, and to have nowhere to lay His head, to bear distress and contumely of all kinds, to suffer agony of soul, and, finally, to be scourged and crucified to death; to contemplate His death upon the cross, apart from the consideration that He was God incarnate, is to deprive it of all its greatness.

EUG: But surely our Saviour's death is more the cause of our salvation than His birth, and therefore should be more prominently put forth?

PHIL: His birth, as well as His death, are but incidents in the great fact of the Incarnation;—it is a very solemn subject, but one may say without irreverence that the Incarnation of God the Son would have been an ineffable condescension, a sacrifice beyond our capacity to fathom, even if it had not ended by His cruel death upon the Cross, whereas, the death of Christ would have been but as the death of any other martyr, if He had not been God incarnate.

EUG: I still seem to feel that we ought to look chiefly to "Christ crucified," at the same time, of course, always implying the Incarnation.

PHIL: "Christ manifest in the flesh" should be remembered as well as "Christ crucified." Mind, I am not saying that you should dwell on the Incarnation alone, to the exclusion of its crowning incident, but that you should keep all constantly before you; it is not safe in such important doctrines to express one point constantly and leave the other to be implied.

EUG: But, as a matter of fact, both are thoroughly believed.

PHIL: All sects of Christians believe in the death of Christ upon the cross; but there are various degrees of appreciation of the Incarnation, descending from a thorough conviction (which I do not doubt you have), through mere acquiescence, down to disbelief in it. The Unitarians believe the Crucifixion, but disbelieve the Incarnation; and it is said that Protestant Germany either disbelieves it also, or gives but a reluctant assent.

EUG: But, after all, we are not concerned with what Unitarians or foreign Protestants may do or think.

PHIL: Except that we may take warning by their example; we see what neglect of the Incarnation has produced amongst them, let us beware that it does not produce the same result amongst ourselves.

EUG: Well, I admit that it is desirable that the Incarnation should be kept clearly in view; the only question is which is the best way to do it.

PHIL: So far we are agreed; only do not let us blame the Catholics because they adhere to the ancient custom of repeating the Angelical Salutation as one mode of doing it, whilst we ourselves do nothing.

EUG: You say "one mode;" have the Catholics any other mode of making the Incarnation prominent?

PHIL: Many. The images of the Blessed Virgin Mary and Child have that special object; the Angelus bell is another reminder of the same great fact.

EUG: What is the Angelus bell?

PHIL: In Catholic countries a bell is rung at certain hours, at which time all religious people repeat certain sentences, beginning "*Angelus Domini nuntiavit Maria,*" and which consists of the Angelical Salutation and other matters relating to it.

EUG: One word more;—are you quite sure that the object of the Ave Maria is to keep up the remembrance of the Incarnation; is it not, think you, to aggrandise the Virgin Mary herself, and keep her in the minds of the people?

PHIL: It is both.

EUG: That seems to me an evil. In the Roman Catholic system the Virgin Mary occupies too prominent a place.

PHIL: I am convinced you would not think so if you had thoroughly examined the subject.

EUG: But it cannot be right that there should be more addresses to the Virgin Mary than to God.

PHIL: The subject of the invocation of the Blessed Virgin Mary is too important to come in at the end of our present conversation; but remember this, that the honour due to her depends wholly upon the Incarnation; if she be really the Mother of God the Son, no honour that we can show her can be out of place; if she be not, she is worthy of our admiration and respect as a gentle and virtuous woman, and, in my judgment, that is the sole position she occupies in the minds of the best Protestants.

April, 1849.

THE ROSARY, AND DOING ACTS WITH AN INTENTION.

PHILOTHEUS AND EUGENIA.

EUG: Do you remember, Philotheus, the church at Airolo, and the seemingly never-ending repetition of the Lord's Prayer and the Ave Maria which we heard?

PHIL: I remember it well, as I do also the poor, apparently half-crazy woman who seemed to be leading the rest. I thought it a striking scene.

EUG: Striking it was, certainly, but I thought it strikingly irreverent; the tone and manner of the woman who led seemed to me to throw an air of ridicule over the whole; do you think it right that any service to God Almighty should be left to be conducted by a mad woman?

PHIL: I inquired about her at the time, and I learned that she was a poor widow, somewhat wandering in her mind, who spent a large portion of her time in church, taking great delight in leading the Rosary, and, as she did it correctly and with great constancy and devotion, there was no disposition to interfere with her, notwithstanding her nasal twang, especially as she seemed capable of little else. I was told that the people had a great regard for her.

EUG: I felt it at the time to be anything but reverential, and wondered it should be allowed.

PHIL: Well, I thought of Anna the Prophetess, also a widow, who departed not from the temple, but served God with fasting and prayer night and day.

EUG: But, as to the Rosary itself, what can be said in justification for so meaningless a mode of worship as

that of repeating the Lord's Prayer and the Ave Maria over and over again for an hour and more?

PHIL: There is more to be said for it than you think.

EUG: Well, I should like to hear what is said.

PHIL: As to what actually is said by Catholic writers in justification or recommendation of the use of the Rosary I really do not know; but I think I can see enough to satisfy me that it ought not to excite any distaste in any one, and is not so meaningless as you may think.

EUG: What, then, is your view of it?

PHIL: To explain myself properly, you must allow me to say a word or two on the nature of prayer; and first, you will agree with me in this, that the essence, the soul (if I may so speak), of prayer consists in the inward desire of the heart, and that, if that be absent, if we have no real desire for the blessing which our lips are asking, no form of words we can use will be likely to obtain it.

EUG: So far I quite concur.

PHIL: It is equally plain that, if we have that inward desire of the heart, God, who can read our thoughts and who "knoweth our necessities before we ask," does not require an actually expressed request on our parts for the purpose of informing Him of our wants.

EUG: Not for the purpose of informing Him, certainly; but He may still require that we should express our wants, that we should ask, in order to have.

PHIL: Most certainly; God has created us with a body as well as a soul, and He seems to will that we should in some way make our body concur in our mental desires: a wish, an aspiration of the mind, costs us nothing; but the expression of it in words is an act, an act of faith, involving a certain sacrifice of time and attention; and so far as it does involve a sacrifice, however small, it gives, if I may use such a figure, weight and momentum to our inward prayer.

EUG: I agree with you thus far, that it seems probable that, in proportion as we accompany our inward desires with a genuine and fervent expression of them, so we are likely to have those desires fulfilled.

PHIL: Genuineness and fervency are obviously essential to all prayer; but it may be exhibited and encouraged by other acts than by merely expressing our wants. St. Augustine says that "to *continue long* in prayer does not necessarily imply the using many words"—that "much speaking is one thing, and an enduring fervency another"; he also complains of those who introduce the art of rhetoric into their prayers, as if by such means God were persuaded; and, again, that it "is not words that we want in order to obtain our desires, but intense and fervent application of mind, pure love, and a suppliant spirit."

EUG: We must all concur in this.

PHIL: It is plain then, that, in the opinion of St. Augustine, a suppliant spirit and an enduring fervency are of more importance than the words we use; indeed, he says in another place, that the *mental posture* of prayer calms and purifies the soul; so that it is probable that fervency of spirit, however exhibited, and an earnest intention, may avail, though our desires may be very imperfectly expressed, or not expressed in words at all.

EUG: I endeavour to follow you, but I am not quite clear that I understand you.

PHIL: I mean that any outward action done with a special intention, and involving a degree of sacrifice or self-denial on our part, may give weight to our desires with God, or, if I may change the metaphor, may give them wings; for instance, self-denying charity in the form of alms to the poor, or the devotion of our substance to God's service, or again the sacrificing of a larger portion of our time and attention than the mere expression of our desires would involve, or fasting, or again bodily labour or exertion, even involving toilsome acts, such as mounting a steep hill to successive stations, praying at each, or going on a pilgrimage. The Venerable Bede, on this subject, says: "Prayer consists not only in the words by which we call upon the Divine mercy, but also in all those things *which we do* with the devotedness of faith."

EUG: Well, my feeling certainly is, that the true way

to render God propitious to our prayer is to address Him in actual supplication, stating our wants, and not in an idle repetition of the same thing over and over again.

PHIL: All repetitions of prayer are not idle repetitions; our Blessed Saviour Himself, in His agony in the garden; repeated His prayer, "saying the same words." Repetitions may, indeed, be "vain repetitions;" but they are not "vain" if they tend to hold the attention and regulate the thoughts. A woman with a sick child, has no difficulty in forming the mental wish that he may recover; that wish arises in her mind spontaneously, and involves no sacrifice: to express it in words "O God, restore my child," involves but little more; however long she may make her prayer, that is its meaning; and all but that are additions, to make her real object more acceptable. Now, everyone feels that something more is necessary than the mere expression of the wish: a Protestant would probably swell out his prayer with what are, in reality, pious reflections; a Roman Catholic would probably say the Rosary with an intention.

EUG: Well, I still hold to what I have already expressed, that an actual continuous address to God would be more acceptable to Him than the mere repetition of the same words, however sacred, over and over again.

PHIL: Very few persons, in reality, are capable of continuous prayer to God, or of a continuous chain of pious reflection; almost all would adopt some mode of collecting their thoughts, and keeping them at least from degenerating into idle musings; a Catholic may do this by means of the Rosary, every portion of which is in his mind connected with some sacred subject of meditation; a Protestant, if he could read, would probably read a Psalm with the same object.

EUG: But how can a person be saying Pater Nosters and Ave Marias, and at the same time be thinking of something else?

PHIL: If it were nothing more than the repetitions of the words with an earnest intention, and an endeavour by so doing to affect the mind reverentially, the saying

of the Rosary would be a sacrifice of time and attention to God, and so would make prayer more acceptable to Him; but, in fact, it is universally alleged by all who have tried it, that the saying of the Rosary is capable of being made available for holding the mind in an attitude of fervency, and for helping contemplation.

EUG: But do you not believe that, in practice, the saying Pater Nosters and Ave Marias is a mere "vain repetition," carrying no train of thought with it?

PHIL: No doubt, there is every variety of attention with which such acts may be done, from utter inattention up to the most perfect dedication of the mind to God; and so there is in the degree of attention with which a Psalm may be read.

EUG: What, then, is meant by the "vain repetitions" which we are not to use, if it does not apply to such repetitions as these?

PHIL: The passage in the Vulgate stands: "When ye pray do not ye use many words, as the Gentiles do," that is, do not proceed to inform God oratorically, and at great length, of all you think you want, as the Gentiles do; "for," it goes on, "your heavenly Father knoweth what things ye have need of, before ye ask Him"; this conclusion of the sentence shows that it is the too minute statements of our wants which is discouraged, on the ground that God knows them. Or, if the words "vain repetitions" be insisted upon, it must mean such repetitions of our actual requests (as, indeed, the heathen practised) as if God *did not know* what things we have need of, unless informed of them, or as if He were not omnipresent, and it were therefore necessary to repeat the supplication again and again so as to have a better chance of being heard. These words could not mean to discourage a repetition of terms of adoration or praise, or of holy contemplation: for the cherubim are said not to rest day or night saying "Holy, Holy, Holy, Lord God of Hosts."

EUG: I do not dispute that contemplation may be very useful, and that in order to that it may be right, as it would be for purposes of adoration and praise, to use such repetitions; but when I want to pray to God, it

is an attitude of prayer that I want, not one of contemplation.

PHIL: The frame of mind in which you pray may have a great deal to do with the success of your prayer—for instance, a careful reading of the 51st Psalm may induce feelings of self-abasement and penitence which may make your prayer far more available than it would be without them; or a recurrence to our Saviour's sufferings may induce a patient spirit which may make you more fit to receive the blessing you ask; but beside this, I repeat, any such exercise is an *act* involving a degree of sacrifice more or less valuable according to its earnestness, and this, done with an intention to the object of your prayer, must aid it.

EUG: You talk a great deal about "intention," but I scarcely know what you mean by it.

PHIL: If a man having received some great mercy or blessing from God, should, in the overflowing of his gratitude, throw himself upon his knees and say the "Te Deum" without even naming the cause of his gratitude, that would be saying it with an intention; and who can doubt that that expression of gratitude would be equally acceptable to God as if He had in words recounted His mercy? and so, in like manner, the mother in distress at her child's sickness, might say her Rosary with an intention, and perhaps never mention her sorrow in words. In both cases it would be the fervent spirit which would be acceptable to God.

EUG: One word more;—you are now speaking of *words* of praise, adoration, or contemplation being acceptable to God, as giving weight to prayer; but some time since, you spoke of *acts* done with an intention being also a help to prayer; what ground have you for that supposition?

PHIL: My answer is one in which you will at once concur. Our Blessed Saviour mentions, especially, *fasting* as giving force to prayer.

SOCIAL PRAYER.

PHILOTHEUS AND EUGENIA.

EUG : You say that there is more fervour and earnestness in the prayers of Roman Catholics, and, if we may judge by what meets our eyes, there seems to be some ground for the observation ; but is there not one great advantage in the public worship of the English Church over that of the Roman Catholic, in regard that the former is more social and united ?

PHIL : If sociality in prayer requires not only a simultaneous praying together, but also that all present shall use the same words, then, no doubt, the prayers of our Church are more social than those of the Roman Catholic.

EUG : Well, then, I think you will admit that in this respect the worship of the English Church is superior to that of the Roman Catholic.

PHIL : Before you ask me to admit this, will you listen fairly to what I have to say about it ?

EUG : Most certainly, as I really wish to know what view you take of the subject. I thought you used to grant that the Anglican worship did exhibit a greater degree of sociality than the Roman ?

PHIL : I grant it still, taking your sense of sociality ; for, if your meaning of "social worship" be the correct one, the service of the Church of England is not only social, but exclusively social.

EUG : Certainly : and should it not be so ? When people come together to the house of God, it is for the very purpose of uniting their prayers ; any particular and private subjects of prayer are more suitable for privacy.

PHIL: My view of the advantage of praying in a church is not confined to the opportunity it gives for praying unitedly in a form of prayer. I look upon a church as a holy place in which we are more immediately in the presence of God, and that all prayer, social or particular, is better said in a church (the opportunity occurring) than elsewhere.

EUG: It seems to me that there are certain prayers suited for privacy, others suitable for families, others suitable for public prayer—these last of a more general character ("Common Prayer," in fact), and that it is for these in particular that we meet together in church.

PHIL: Roman Catholics do not consider that the church is to be used solely for that kind of prayer. They use it, first, for private prayer—this they do at any time which may suit them, nor do they think it an advantage to be alone; if others be there, they launch their own bark into the stream of prayer, and think themselves helped by the current flowing onwards to the throne of God, though the wants of those who are praying with them and their own are utterly unknown to each other. They use the church also for social prayer in your sense—namely, joint and pre-determined prayer in the same words—this they do by joining at stated times in Litanies and Rosaries, as well as in Vespers and Compline; but, beyond these, they use the church for that highest form of worship of Almighty God, the sacrifice of the Mass, during which the whole congregation may pour out each their own heart to God, "young men and maidens, old men and children": now it is that the grief of the sorrowful, the joy of the grateful, the sober supplication of the aged, and the lisping of infancy, the well-considered prayer of the wise and learned, and the interrupted ejaculations of the ignorant, all rise up like incense before Him.

EUG: But you would not call that social prayer?

PHIL: I call it social prayer in the highest sense; sociality does not consist in forcing all (however varied their states of mind may be) at all times of public prayer, into precisely the same attitude, but in coming together with the same solemn object. The chorus of prayer need

not be all in unison—the finest harmonies may consist of the most varied notes and instruments.

EUG: This view of sociality in prayer never occurred to me, nor, I imagine, till lately, to you.

PHIL: That is highly probable; for the public worship of the English Church makes little or no provision for it, and we have consequently lost sight of it; but, in the Roman Catholic Church, their most solemn services—namely, the Mass and Benediction—are dedicated to it; my feeling is, that if the great object of meeting be the solemn and hearty worship of God, the greater the variety of prayer the greater the sociality.

EUG: I, on the other hand, have thought that the more complete the uniformity, the greater the sociality.

PHIL: Look at a village where each is following his own occupation, and compare it with the uniform evolutions of soldiers; the latter may be grand and striking, and eminently useful in its proper place, but is it social? Again, which is the most social—an assembly of friends, or a Court procession? What more magnificent idea can there be of united worship than that comprised in the Benedicite, or, if I may quote a human composition in the same breath with an inspired poem, than that presented by Milton in the Morning Hymn in Paradise, where he calls upon all created things—sun, moon, stars, air, mists, winds, trees, and fountains, as well as all living souls—to join in praise to God, each according to its own nature and capacity; so with the united worship of man—that is, in my judgment, the most solemn, the most real, and the most truly social which, while simultaneous in time, is suited to the condition as well as to the capacity of each, and which may reach the throne of God like the roar of many waters.

EUG: You seem, then, to undervalue social prayer in my sense?

PHIL: Far from it; I admire it, and esteem it of the highest value even as a religious exercise. All have their times of flagging, and their times of wandering of mind. United prayer, with such forms, are at such times a great support and encouragement; but to have nothing else but

set forms, is like never swimming without corks. Again, public prayer, confined to set forms, and in which all persons, at all times, and however varied their conditions, are to use precisely the same words, is apt to become unreal, and ceases to hold the attention.

EUG: It seems, then, that you are an advocate for extempore prayer.

PHIL: By no means; it is not a question between extempore prayer and predetermined prayer. During the Catholic Mass, probably all the varied prayers which may be used may be predetermined prayers, each, however, using such as they find suitable to their own condition or frame of mind. As to extempore prayer in general, there may be minds so acute and ready as to be able to pour out their hearts in spontaneous language; but, with the great majority of mankind, the mind, occupied with composing suitable language, is withdrawn from a due intention, at least in part—all can use unpremeditated short ejaculations, but very few can with propriety use continuous extempore prayer;—I am sure I cannot.

EUG: But do you not think that without a form of prayer read audibly, and so as to hold the ear as well as the eye, the mind is more apt to wander; in short, does not the voice of the minister keep the attention alive, is it not a continual reminder of what is going on, and does it not make musing more difficult than if you are left entirely to your own thoughts?

PHIL: It is a subject we have no time to discuss now; but the Catholic Mass service consists of a continual succession of reminders—every part of it, every action, has its meaning, and tends to arouse the attention; but as to the audible reading of the prayers preventing wandering, I cannot say, from my own experience, that I am less disposed to muse during audible prayers than during silence—indeed, I think that audible prayers and exhortations may become so familiar as to pass over the ear without exciting the slightest impression. How many persons carry their minds with “Dearly beloved brethren”? How it may be with others, of course, I cannot say; but, in casting my thoughts back at the end of the Litany, I find, too

often, that very few of the precatious have ever touched my mind.

EUG: Well, I am still disposed to think that the highest form of public worship is that in which all utter the same words and join in the same praises, although I cannot deny that there is something very beautiful also in that kind of social worship which leaves each at liberty to prefer his own petition.

PHIL: If you will admit to me that each has its own peculiar suitableness, I am content; we shall then cease to find fault with the Roman Catholic service, that it is not always social in your sense.

EUG: You will still allow me to think that the Anglican service is, from its congregational character, more striking than the Roman.

PHIL: No, I cannot admit even this. Just enter a Catholic Church at the most solemn part of the Mass, and see the whole congregation on their knees in silence, the priest apparently motionless, and say if that scene is not infinitely more striking and impressive than anything which one of our churches presents.

PRAYER AND WORSHIP: THE MASS.

PHILOTHEUS AND EUGENIA.

EUG: At the end of one of our late conversations, you expressed your admiration of the appearance of a Catholic church, at the most solemn part of the Mass; you said you thought it striking; now I do not deny that it may be striking as a scene, but I am sure I could never take any interest in a service which I could not understand, or where I could not accompany the minister in his devotions.

PHIL: If we were Catholics, we should or might understand and accompany every word.

EUG: But I see persons, during the progress of the Mass, following their own private devotions, and obviously not attending in the least to what is going on.

PHIL: They may be attending more than you suppose; but there is a peculiarity in the Mass service, which makes it, till explained, incomprehensible to a Protestant.

EUG: Well, what explanation have you to give of it?

PHIL: The whole Mass service, and every portion of it, has its explanation—there is no incident in it, or even any movement of the priest, which has not its meaning. It is not, however, in this respect that I now speak of its requiring explanation to a Protestant, but in regard to the service itself as a solemn *act* of homage.

EUG: Go on; for at present I do not see your drift.

PHIL: I will; but I must take you step by step, and you may find me tedious.

EUG: Never fear that.

PHIL: The public services of the Church, in the eye of a Protestant, are chiefly useful for three purposes—for prayer, for thanksgiving, and for instruction: he has little, if any, notion of a public service as an occasion for a solemn act of homage, and dutiful reverence to God, irrespective of either of these.

EUG: What act of homage can be greater than that of praying to Him?

PHIL: In that question you have precisely expressed the Protestant idea, that there is no act of worship higher than that of prayer; there is, however, and always has been, in the world a mode of worshipping God by a *solemn action* called sacrifice, and this is what takes place in the Mass.

EUG: I know that the Sacrament of the Holy Eucharist is, in a sense, a sacrifice; but I do not exactly see how sacrifice, one kind of worship, is superior to prayer, which is another kind of worship.

PHIL: It is superior in this: prayer, thanksgiving, worship, are not services rendered to God alone, all of them are acts which in their degree may be applied to human creatures; sacrifice is due to God, and to none but Him.

EUG: You use words which startle me; how can prayer and worship be addressed to any but God?

PHIL: Prayer is a request—it may be made to God, or it may be made to man, or, as Catholics, say, it may be made to angels and departed spirits; it is in its essence the same, to whomsoever it may be addressed; it differs only in respect to the thing asked for; certain requests or prayers can only be made to God, others may be made to men, others again to saints and angels.

EUG: But requests made to men are not, or ought not to be, called prayers.

PHIL: But, as a matter of fact, they are; the English language always speak of earnest or formal requests as prayers.

EUG: Is that so? for I am not conscious of that custom.

PHIL: In the first place, the Queen, both Houses of

the Legislature, all the Courts of Judicature, even the officials of the civil administration of the kingdom, down to the humblest tribunal having power to hear and determine anything, are, one and all, addressed by means of petitions, the request of which is always denominated "the prayer." Again, even in common parlance the word is retained—"I pray you;" nay, much stronger words—"I entreat you," "I beseech you," "I implore you"—are all expressions of ordinary daily use.

EUG: Yes, I see it is so; but the word, as used in such cases, does not mean the same thing as prayer to God.

PHIL: It differs only in regard to the thing asked for, and in regard to the person addressed; but it is in every case, in its essence, a request.

EUG: But this a mere play of words; the same word being used, does not necessarily imply that it is the same thing.

PHIL: That is exactly what I say. If, therefore you hear that Catholics *pray* to Saints, do not conclude at once that they are offering the same degree of homage to them as they do to God. I am the more desirous of making this clear to you, as all Protestants assume that Catholics give Divine honour to Saints because they talk of praying to them; whereas, the thing asked for makes all the difference in the character of the act.

EUG: I cannot help feeling that an address to God, and an address to any human being, ought not to be called by the same name.

PHIL: There I quite agree with you; and, if our language were richer, it would not be necessary; but, as a matter of fact, in our language one word signifies both.

EUG: But you said just now that "worship" was not peculiar to Almighty God?

PHIL: I did; and I will explain that to you. Many of the controversies of the world are merely verbal; and this word *worship* has been, and is, from its having no fixed meaning, the cause of much misunderstanding and of groundless accusations.

EUG: To come to the point, Catholics admit that they

worship the Virgin Mary and the Saints, and I suppose you are going to explain that away?

PHIL: I am going to explain it, and to show you that the poverty of human language has led to the use of the same word to mean things as different in degree, as God Himself is different from the other beings or things which are said to be worshipped.

EUG: Things?

PHIL: Yes, things; for, in common parlance, Catholics speak of worshipping images, pictures, relics, and places.

EUG: I know they do, and that is what Protestants find fault with: worship is due to God only, and surely cannot be paid to created things or beings.

PHIL: As before, we must not be carried away by words. "Worship" is a variable term—it means respect, reverence, honour, and that in the degree suitable to the person or thing it is applied to. A certain degree of these may be paid to places and things as well as to persons. "Take off thy shoes from off thy feet, for the place whereon thou standest is holy ground," is an instance of the respect or reverence which may be due to places; the ark of the covenant, of that due to certain things.

EUG: This should not be called worship. I feel that to be the word signifying the reverence due to God.

PHIL: It certainly would be less likely to mislead if there were different words to signify different degrees of reverence or worship: that due to God is, indeed, usually called "Divine worship;" but, as I said before, our language is not rich enough.

EUG: But "worship," in its main signification, as it seems to me, means the kind of language which is due to God. When, then, it is habitually applied by Catholics to the honour they pay to Saints, it can scarcely be but that they must worship the Saints in the same sense.

PHIL: Not more than a husband, in the Marriage Service, affirms that he "worships" his wife—he affixes such a sense to the word as is due and suitable to the person towards whom it is used, as we do also when we use the title "worshipful" to magistrates. The use of these words

and others like them—"majesty," "reverence," "grace," "holiness," "excellency"—as applied to men, is in a restrained and subordinate sense; and no one feels that the use of them implies the deifying the persons to whom they are used.

EUG: We are familiar with these terms as so applied, and therefore no harm arises from the use of them.

PHIL: And, in like manner, Catholics are familiar with the term "worship," and, as applied to things, men, or Saints, never dream of intending Divine worship: we should remember, therefore, that, when Catholics say they worship images, they mean that they honour them with a subordinate honour suitable to them, and which is referred altogether to the person they represent.

EUG: But the use of such words for things so different must, in many cases, confound, and lead to the real worshipping of created things instead of honouring them.

PHIL: The use of such words by persons not accustomed to them might, but not by persons who have been used to them. Do you think a man who says he adores his wife, or a woman who says she adores her husband, is in the least danger of confounding that kind of adoration with the adoration due to God?

EUG: No; but the term "worship," as used by Roman Catholics, is accompanied by attitudes implying Divine worship—they bow and kneel before their images—they can do no more before God Himself. Farther, the countenances of persons praying before images of the Virgin Mary, frequently exhibit a greater degree of earnestness than when they are praying to God Himself.

PHIL: Bowing and kneeling do not imply Divine honour, else how much we ourselves transgress in kneeling to the Queen; and what ought we to think of the Lord Chancellor, who, in taking his seat in the House of Lords, bows every day to the empty throne? The truth is, that these actions, like the words we have been considering, have a variable meaning, suited to the occasion on which they are used; and as to the earnestness of the countenances of persons praying before images of the Blessed Virgin, as I have had occasion to remark to you

before, that is not measured by the greatness of the person addressed, but by the real distress or anxiety of the party praying—by the subject matter of the prayer, not by the dignity of the person prayed to.

EUG: Well; but what is the result of all this discussion?

PHIL: I have been endeavouring to show you that the expressions "prayer" and "worship" are not applicable to God alone, but are habitually applied to signify an inferior degree of entreaty or honour than that which would be used to God; and I have also shown you that the attitude in which requests are made, or in which honour is paid, implies no more than is due to the person addressed, and can mislead no one, and certainly not the person using it; and that earnestness and intensity of feeling are measured by the object sought for, not by the person addressed.

EUG: Well; go on.

PHIL: And, therefore, that we ought never to charge Catholics with raising the Saints to a level with God because they say they pray to them or worship them, or because they kneel when they do so, or because they do so with earnestness, inasmuch as they do these things in a well-known subordinate meaning.

EUG: I think I understand your explanation, though I have a difficulty in realising it.

PHIL: If you understand that there *is* an explanation, I am satisfied; but now let us return to our original subject—the Mass. The Mass is neither mere prayer nor ordinary worship—these, as I have said, may be exercised towards beings inferior to God, but sacrifice is due to God alone, and is never offered to any created being, and in the Mass it exhibits itself as a *solemn action*, to be celebrated by the priest in God's honour, at which the faithful assist by their presence. There are occasions on which human monarchs are visited by their subjects, not for the mere purpose of presenting petitions or asking favours, but to render them the honour, respect, and reverence which is due to them, and as occasions of exciting and keeping up those feelings. Thus it is that

a person may be present at, and join in, the act of homage performed by the priest, without knowing or following all the minute and careful observances with which it is accompanied, many of which are preparations on the part of the priest himself.

EUG : I cannot myself feel that this kind of mixed worship is so noble a tribute as that which is joined in by all present as if they had but one soul.

PHIL : We probably should think otherwise if we had carefully considered the whole service, and thoroughly understood it : but let it suffice to say now, that at the celebration of the Mass, those present know the general course of the great action which is going on—they may, if they please, follow it word by word, or they may occupy themselves with supplication, thanksgiving, or praise, or they may keep themselves in an humble, grateful, suppliant, or meditative attitude of mind, without any specific requests or addresses to God ; this, however, is at first difficult of apprehension to a Protestant, who has no occasions of public worship in which his precise occupation, whether of prayer or praise, is not predetermined and fixed.

EUG : One word more ;—surely in praying to God, we are occupied in as solemn an act as man is capable of ; ought we to be less careful and reverential when so occupied than when assisting at the Mass ?

PHIL : There is no doubt that in prayer to God, the mind may be, and ought to be, in the same reverential attitude as when assisting at the sacrifice of the Mass. The observation regarding prayer is, that it does not, from its nature, necessarily imply the highest degree of adoration and homage, but that it is of a variable character, depending upon the party or being, addressed. Prayer to God is the highest quality of prayer and ought to be accompanied by the highest degree of adoration ; prayer to departed Saints is inferior in quality, both as regards the things asked for and the mode of asking ; prayer to human monarchs or judges is inferior again, as is the mode of addressing them. This distinction in the quality of the addresses to God, to Saints, and to men is

not sufficiently apprehended by Protestants, who assume at once that, because Catholics pray to the Saints, therefore they offer *the same kind of worship* to them that they do to God, which, as I have shown you, is a misapprehension.

Aug., 1850.

LATIN PRAYERS.

“Benedic, Domine, nos, et hæc tua dona, quæ de tuâ largitate sumus sumpturi, per Jesum Christum Dominum nostrum.”

PHILOTHEUS AND EUGENIA.

EUG: What is your object, dear Philotheus, in teaching your children to say their grace, and parts of their prayers, in Latin? Would not their minds go with the words they use much more certainly if they were said in English?

PHIL: At first sight this may seem to be so: but a more careful consideration will, I think, lead to the opposite conclusion.

EUG: But surely the mind will more readily accompany a language it understands, than one it does not understand?

PHIL: Of course, if the language used is not understood at all, the intention of the mind cannot go with it; but, in the case of our children, the Latin graces and prayers they use are, to a certain extent, understood, in some cases thoroughly, in all partially.

EUG: Well; but, after all, their own tongue must be infinitely more familiar to them, and so the intention of the mind would more certainly accompany the words if spoken in English.

PHIL: It may seem a riddle to say so; but, in my judgment, a language may be too familiar for solemn occasions, even too familiar to carry the mind with the words used.

EUG: How can that be?

PHIL: In the first place, words used in ordinary discourse upon ordinary subjects are apt to have an ordinary and commonplace meaning in the mind, and which we cannot but feel to be inadequate to the higher thoughts to which we wish to apply them.

EUG: I scarcely follow you; give me an instance of what you mean.

PHIL: Did you ever see a translation of our Litany in French? There you will find this response, "Exaucez nous s'il vous plait." Now, these words, though they express precisely what is meant, are, to my mind, too familiar and unsuitable to express the solemn address "Te rogamus audi nos." I have heard you yourself, on serious occasions, say "Deo gratias," and I cannot doubt that you felt it to be a more solemn way of saying "Thank God." We all feel "Amen" to be more expressive than "So be it," and "Hallelujah" than any corresponding English ejaculation. Again, "Mia cara" is more impressive than "My dear," and "Adieu" than "Good-bye." Mottoes are always more striking in Latin than in English. I could enlarge upon this; but it may suffice to say that the habit of quotation from other languages proceeds chiefly upon the supposition that you become more impressive, or even more perspicuous, by clothing your thoughts in a less familiar tongue.

EUG: The instances you give are all of them cases in which the language adopted is (so far as it is used) as thoroughly understood as your own; but how do you justify the use of a language less readily understood, as must be the case with children in respect to Latin graces?

PHIL: Language may be so familiar as to pass through the mind without producing any impression. Did you never observe that our own children, on saying grace in English, not unfrequently say the grace after meals instead of the grace before, and *vice versâ*, without perceiving their error? This shows that the familiarity of the language does not secure the intention of the mind.

EUG: That arises from inattention, and might happen just as well if the grace were said in Latin as in English.

PHIL: No doubt it might; but my theory is, that if the words used are not so familiar they, as it were, arrest, or rub, the mind more. Did you never observe after grace has been said, that you sometimes forget whether it has been said or no; and in taking wine with a person at dinner, whether you have made the conventional bow?

The explanation is, that these things have become so over-familiar that they produce no effect upon the mind.

EUG: The instances you mention, we are, of course, all conscious of; but still I do not see why Latin prayers and graces might not pass over the tongue as heedlessly as if they were said in English.

PHIL: No doubt they might; but not being so familiar as English, there is, I repeat, more chance of the attention being arrested. Indeed, I go farther, and say, that the very circumstance of the words used being with less readiness apprehended by the mind, causes the mind to be more certainly excited.

EUG: Dear Philotheus, how can that be?

PHIL: I must answer you by a simile;—the electric current passing along a good conducting wire produces no effect on its temperature, but a less perfect conductor becomes hot by the slightly impeded passage of the current.

EUG: A very poetical explanation, certainly.

PHIL: But not less true on that account; and as you have mentioned poetry, I may say, as a farther illustration, that both painting and poetry become more impressive when the meaning is slightly veiled. A sentence in plain English is like a Dutch painting—the mind is passive, the lowest only of the mental faculties is called into exercise, namely, simple apprehension.

EUG: This, then, is the mode in which you would justify the use of Latin in the public prayers of the Roman Catholics?

PHIL: It is partly so; but there are still more important reasons for that practice; my present object, however, has been merely to justify the use of short prayers and ejaculations in Latin for private use, and that, even for children.

INTERCESSION AND INVOCATION OF SAINTS

AND THE

OFFICE OF THE BLESSED VIRGIN.

PHILOTHEUS AND EUGENIA.

EUG: You know, dear Philotheus, I am not indisposed to admit, that many of the common objections to the doctrines and practices of the Roman Catholic Church are either without foundation or much exaggerated; but there is one point so abhorrent to my feelings, that it alone, if there were nothing else, would be enough to repel me from the Roman Catholic system.

PHIL: I conclude you mean the Invocation of Saints?

EUG: Yes; I mean the Invocation of Saints, as it exhibits itself practically in the Roman Church.

PHIL: Can you specify a little more precisely, what it is which is distasteful to you in this doctrine or practice?

EUG: It is not only alleged and believed, that the Saints, and the Virgin Mary especially, are empowered by God to procure blessings for us by their prayers; but the extent of this power, admitting it to exist, is represented to us in so exaggerated a form, that the ordinary language used regarding it seems to me to amount to little short of blasphemy—for instance, the Virgin Mary (for it is of her that I wish to speak in particular) is held up as being the universal channel of all graces to man, a title, as it seems to me, only applicable to our Blessed Saviour Himself.

PHIL: If I understand you rightly, you are not now objecting to the doctrine that the Saints pray for us, or even that we may perhaps ask them to do so, but to the degree of power alleged to be possessed by them, and

especially to the exalted position attributed to the Blessed Virgin?

EUG: My position is this—even assuming that departed Saints may pray for us, and that we are at liberty to invoke them to do so (which I by no means concede), the alleged office of the Virgin Mary, as put forth by the Roman Catholic Church (namely, that of being the chief, if not the necessary, channel of God's graces), is a shocking exaggeration.

PHIL: The doctrine to which I understand you to object, then, is this—that the Saints departed pray for us; and farther, that they, and, in a peculiar and especial degree, the Blessed Virgin, are not merely the occasional cause, but the ordinary channel of God's blessings to us?

EUG: Exactly.

PHIL: And this doctrine, you think, *a priori*, so improbable, as to discredit the whole system of which it forms a part?

EUG: Yes; that is my feeling most undoubtedly; however much I might be disposed to acquiesce in the claims of the Roman Catholic Church, the teaching or permission of such practices as these would be sufficient to repel me; but I am quite ready, dear Philotheus, to hear any explanation you may be able to give.

PHIL: In the first place, then, you are of course aware, that it is held, that whatever blessings are conferred on us by the instrumentality of the Saints are attributable, not to their own power, but to their intercession for us?

EUG: Yes; I understand that; but still the idea, that the Virgin Mary is the channel of all graces to us, seems to me to imply that she has a positive office in the scheme of redemption; and it is altogether inconceivable, to me, that God Almighty should give such power to a creature,—it raises her to an eminence which hides our Saviour, who is our great intercessor.

PHIL: Our Blessed Saviour is our intercessor in a totally different sense from that in which any human being can be so; His "agony and bloody sweat," His "cross and passion," His "precious death and burial," all the events of His incarnation, in fact, continually pre-

sented by Him to God the Father, intercede and plead for us. He is also the ultimate channel of all intercessions, from whomsoever they may come; but we must not imagine, as most Protestants do, that our Blessed Lord (Himself God) is constantly praying as a suppliant to God the Father on our behalf, in the same manner that human creatures pray.

EUG: The doctrine which I object to, assumes that God's grace and mercy are obtained chiefly, if not solely, through human intercession; how can it require human intercession to obtain for us what Christ died to obtain, and for which, on our behalf, He continues in some ineffable manner to intercede?

PHIL: Christ's merits are doubtless enough to atone for and wash out the sins of a thousand worlds; nevertheless they must be applied, and they do not apply themselves spontaneously. All Christians are brought within reach of them; but it still remains that they individually obtain the benefit of them. Now, you will admit that as intercessory prayer is commanded, there is, no doubt, some mysterious ways in which it benefits those who are prayed for?

EUG: Certainly; but this doctrine seems to imply that human intercession is necessary to make God's mercies effectual.

PHIL: The whole system of God's dealings with man is one of intermediate means. If God had so willed it, He might have pardoned the sins of the whole world by His will alone,—He has thought fit to do it by the intermediate means of the incarnation of His Son; He could grant all graces and blessings spontaneously,—He has thought fit to make the Sacraments the intermediate means in regard to some; is there, then, anything improbable in the supposition that He may have made intercessory prayer an intermediate means?

EUG: No doubt, prayer is available with God; but on what grounds is it supposed that all blessings are granted through the intermediate means of prayer?

PHIL: It seems not improbable, having regard to the analogy of God's general dealings with man; the very

fruits of the earth do not become fitted for the use of man but by his own instrumentality; and observe what great stress is laid upon constant prayer in the Holy Scriptures; it would not be so commanded, if it were not permitted to have some effect.

EUG: Prayer may be commanded as inducing or indicating a suitable frame of mind for the reception of God's blessings, and not as a necessary preliminary.

PHIL: Prayer *for ourselves*, involving a certain degree of sacrifice of time and attention, may, in that respect, induce God's blessings and obtain an answer; but why is intercessory prayer, that is, *prayers for others*, commanded? That neither indicates nor induces a suitable frame of mind in the party prayed for, nor does it invoke any sacrifice on his part; so that God Almighty is obviously moved to grant blessings irrespective of the conduct or condition of the recipient. God could grant blessings without the prayers of others, yet He directs it. He is constantly represented as being moved to grant blessings through intercessory prayer. He might have pardoned Eliphaz, the Temanite, spontaneously, or on his own prayer; but He directs him to seek the intercessory prayer of Job. (Job xliii.) In like manner, He desires Abimelech to seek the prayer of Abraham. (Genesis xx.) All which implies that God has ordained that prayer should, in some mysterious way, be the moving cause of His blessings.

EUG: But what do you deduce from all this? It does not prove to me that the intercession of the Virgin Mary is the appointed mode of obtaining God's blessings.

PHIL: I have not undertaken to prove that to you. I have only undertaken to show you that there is nothing repulsive in such a supposition; and I have commenced by showing you that God Almighty universally works by intermediate means, and that great importance is attached in Holy Scripture to intercessory prayer; from which I deduce that there is nothing outrageously improbable in the supposition that God may think fit to grant all His blessings through human intercession. I repeat, what is there repulsive in it?

EUG: It is only repulsive so far as it seems to derogate from the omnipotence of God, as if He could not confer His blessings except by human co-operation.

PHIL: The suggestion that God Almighty wills to use intermediate means for His purposes, is in no contradiction to His omnipotence; it is beyond a doubt that He does so in some cases; and, to say the least, it is quite possible that He may in all. But, listen, is it more improbable that God should grant His blessing through the channel of the intercession of the Blessed Virgin, than that He should become incarnate through the same channel? As He gave Himself corporeally to the world through her instrumentality, is it so very incredible that He should continue to act spiritually upon it through the same instrumentality?

EUG: Of course, the Almighty may do so; but where is the proof that He does so?

PHIL: I must remind you that I am not endeavouring to prove that He does so; I am only endeavouring to remove the preliminary objection, that the supposed office of the Blessed Virgin is so outrageously improbable, that that doctrine alone is enough to discredit a system of religion in other respects admirable. My point is, that there is nothing improbable in it, nothing a thousandth part so improbable as the Incarnation itself. We believe that God Himself became man, and submitted to suffer death from the hands of His own creatures; and yet we hesitate to believe it *possible* that He may choose to convey blessings through the instrumentality of her, through whom He became incarnate.

EUG: The Incarnation has been distinctly revealed to us, therefore we believe it without hesitation; not so the intercession of the Virgin Mary.

PHIL: But if the doctrine of the intercession of the Blessed Virgin came to us from an acknowledged authority, I suppose we should have no difficulty in believing it? All Protestants would at once believe it if it were plainly revealed in the Bible.

EUG: I suppose they would. If the doctrine came to us with equal authority to that for the Incarnation, I should equally believe it.

PHIL: Then there is nothing repulsive in the idea itself,—nothing that would prevent you receiving it upon due authority?

EUG: Well, I may think it repulsive because it is a setting-up of an intermediate agency without due authority.

PHIL: Now you are putting the question upon its true ground—namely, whether this doctrine has been received without due authority; and this involves the question of the authority of the Church, which we are not now discussing; but will you, dear Eugenia, have patience with me whilst I consider the *probability* of this doctrine a little farther?

EUG: I will try; but I fear you will find me a stubborn pupil.

PHIL: Let us see, then, a little more precisely what the doctrine of intercessory prayer is, as alleged by Catholics:—

1. All human creatures who are alive and remain may pray for each other.
2. Those who remain may pray for those who are gone, and who, they trust, are in a state of purification.
3. Those who are departed in the faith may pray for those who are left behind.
4. Especially may those do so, who are supposed to be admitted to the presence of God in Heaven.

Now, if we admit that the prayer of a righteous man, still living, may, on account of his superior sanctity, avail for us more than our own prayers, why should we think it repulsive that the prayer of the highest and holiest of the Saints in Heaven may be still more effectual?

EUG: But what reason is there for supposing that they occupy themselves about us at all?

PHIL: The highest degree of probability. Living and dead, saints and sinners, we are all one blood, one family, all rescued from the same dangers, all objects of the same mercy; some, it is true, are still struggling in the flesh, whilst others are departed,—of whom some, no doubt

are admitted to the joys of Heaven—can anything be more probable than that these have hopes and wishes regarding us, and that they may be allowed to express them? If righteous *men* have influence with God, why not glorified *saints*? You doubt that the saints pray for us; think of the spirits of the just made perfect, of the innocent souls of children, not to speak of apostles and martyrs, how are they probably occupied? Glorified souls, we are told, are as the angels of God in heaven; now, as angels are ministering spirits to man, is it not probable that the souls of the saints, too, have some similar office relating to them? And what is there repulsive in the idea that that office may be intercession?

EUG: Even if there be intercession for us in heaven, it does not follow that the Virgin Mary should be raised into a universal patroness of the whole human race,—indeed, dear Philotheus, there may be much in what you say, but my mind still recoils at this deification of St. Mary.

PHIL: Then bear with me a little longer. Is there not a gradation in the influence of men with God? As the prayer of the righteous man availeth much, it is probable that the prayer of the most righteous man availeth most; there is an order, a gradation, a hierarchy among the angels, why not a hierarchy of intercessors, each allowed to prevail with God for the Church militant to a degree commensurate with her glory in heaven? Imagine St. Augustine in heaven; is there anything repulsive in the thought that his office and privilege may be to pray and obtain blessings for the country which he converted? May not the apostles have their chief joy in watching over that portion of the Church where they spend their lives and shed their blood, or where their bodies await the resurrection? If their office hereafter will be to sit on thrones and judge, thus partaking in some subordinate degree of Christ's office as judge of quick and dead, is it an outrageous, an offensive idea, that they may, in the meantime, in like subordination, participate in his intercessory office? May not Eve, the mother of us all, think of and intercede for her offspring lost through her trans-

gression? And, lastly, may not the Blessed Virgin, through whom Christ took our nature, and became our brother, and through whose instrumentality we were all born again, and who is therefore in a far higher sense our mother,—may she not intercede for us also? If she may, is it not probable that her intercessions are more effectual than those of other Saints? Eve was the channel of evil to us all; may not the Blessed Virgin be the channel of good to us all? If God's justice permitted the former, is it so very repulsive to imagine that His mercy may have permitted the latter?

EUG: Your fancy draws a vivid picture; it is a pity it has no better foundation.

PHIL: But does it repel you; is it abhorrent to you?

EUG: Not as you put it, certainly; indeed, I must admit that the intercession of the Saints for us, if we were assured of it, would be consolatory in the highest degree; but, admitting that the saints may intercede for us, does it follow that it is lawful to ask them to do so? In the first place, what reasons have we for supposing that they can hear what is addressed to them? You must imagine a kind of omnipresence in them which, surely, trenches upon the attributes of the Almighty?

PHIL: We can know but little of the capacities of spiritual beings; what seems impossible to us, may be very possible notwithstanding. Besides, angels who "rejoice over one sinner that repenteth" must have some mode, inexplicable to us, by which they become acquainted with what passes here; and if angels, why not glorified spirits, who, as I said just now, are to be "as the angels"? Farther, we do not doubt that the devil knows a good deal about us; and if he, surely it is not an impossible supposition that glorified Saints may?

EUG: But the addressing ourselves to other spiritual beings than God, and so setting up additional objects of veneration in the invisible world and allowing the mind to be occupied even in part with them, must detract from the service we might otherwise pay to God?

PHIL: God Almighty has the first claim upon our veneration, our love, our gratitude, and all the highest

emotions of our being ; nevertheless, He permits that we should exercise them all in a subordinate degree towards our fellow-creatures, whom He has placed in certain relations to ourselves,—we may exercise loyalty to one, we may honour another, others we may reverence, others love ; and, in so doing, no one supposes that we are interfering with the exercise of the same emotions towards the Almighty, or trenching upon His prerogative ; for the honour we pay to them is human honour, whilst that which we pay to Him is divine. Then, assuming that God permits Saints departed to be interested and employed on our behalf, why should love, honour, reverence, and such like emotions exercised towards them, be deemed to detract from the honour due to God more than they would be if exercised towards living objects ? Such emotions would be more pure, and more intense, than any earthly object could excite, being freed from the disturbing causes of the world ; but they would still be human affections, not divine.

EUG : Still the occupation of any portion of our time in the veneration, or *cultus* as I believe it is called, of Saints, is surely so much given to the creature, which otherwise would be given to the Creator ?

PHIL : Is it not probable that, if the Saints did not have it, the world would ? Our human affections will find objects, and, if not occupied with those of Heaven, will be attracted by those of earth. God therefore may graciously permit us to love, honour, and venerate the Saints, in order to occupy our attention with objects incompatible with the undue love of the world.

EUG : Might not the honour and reverence of Himself equally hold us from the world ?

PHIL : It ought to do so in a much higher degree ; but (I say it with the greatest diffidence,) it does not necessarily do so. The honour and reverence due to God are a *duty*, and may be paid, and are paid, though in an imperfect and unworthy manner, by persons living in and devoted to the world ; the reverence offered to the Saints has more of a merely permissive character, optional, if I may so say, on the part of him who pays it, and, on

that account, not likely to be practised concurrently with devotion to the world. If therefore you can imbue the mind with love for the Saints, you occupy that human phase of our affections which God has, as it were, left at our disposal, with an object inconsistent with love of the world.

EUG: But those who have seen the devotions of Catholic countries will tell you that the worship paid at shrines of the Virgin Mary are of a much more intense character than those offered to God; that the clasped hand and tearful eye are oftener seen at such shrines than elsewhere; from which they would conclude that if they be human emotions which are there exhibited, they are not distinguishable from such as are due to God.

PHIL: Intensity in prayer is no measure of the quality of the devotion offered; earnestness and intensity are measured by the subject matter. Lady Derwentwater, on her knees, before George I., entreating for her husband's life, and grasping at his cloak in her agony, would indubitably exhibit greater intensity of emotion than many an humble suppliant to the Almighty; yet neither she, nor any one else, would confound her addresses to him with prayer to God.

EUG: You make a good advocate; but, after all, the real question is, what authority is there for the invocation of Saints?

PHIL: Most true; that is the real question; but my present object has merely been to satisfy you that there is nothing, *a priori*, repulsive in the idea itself, that it may be the office of glorified Saints, and especially of the Blessed Virgin, to be the intercessory channels of God's blessings to us, or in the practice of invoking their assistance. The authority of the doctrine or practice is another matter, involving the question of Church authority generally, and which must be considered separately.

ON SUPERNATURALS AND MIRACLES.

There is an indisposition amongst Protestants to admit supernaturals of a religious character, whilst they readily acquiesce in such as are merely secular ; indeed, there are few, if any, to be found, who do not believe in some one or other of the many superstitions which are current amongst us.

For example : is the belief that it is unlucky to help a person to salt, or to spill salt, or to begin any important work on a Friday, or to see a single magpie, or to buy bees, or to walk under a ladder, or to lay your knife and fork across, or to make a present of a knife, or a pair of scissors, or to have a mouse in your room, or to sit down thirteen to dinner,—or the belief that it is lucky to put on your stocking wrong side out and unlucky to change it, or that it is lucky to carry a child upstairs before it goes down, or to have two tea-spoons given you, or to tumble upstairs or to have an old shoe thrown after you when you leave home on being married, or to find a horseshoe,—or the belief that changing seats at cards may change the luck, or that bridecake put through a wedding-ring has some peculiar charm,—more reasonable, than the belief that there are holy places or holy objects in the world at which prayers are more availing with God, or holy times when He is more propitious, or that crossing yourself defends you from evil, or that holy water may cure diseases, or that relics of Saints may have a supernatural virtue ?

A CONVERSATION ON THE ABOVE.

PHILOTHEUS AND EUGENIA.

EUG: If I may make an observation, dear Philotheus, it seems to me that, in what you say about the disinclination on the part of Protestants to believe in religious supernaturals, and the readiness with which they believe in ridiculous superstitions, you assume that the absurd notions

you mention are seriously entertained ; whereas, I should have thought that they were merely matters of joke, and that no one really believes them ; so the parallel between them and religious supernaturals is scarcely a correct one.

PHIL : It is true that many persons ridicule such superstitions, and they deserve to be ridiculed ; but very many, if they do laugh at some of them, have an indescribable feeling about others, and would admit, if you asked them, that they thought there might be something in them. Have you not, for instance, yourself known sensible religious persons who really have had a superstition about mice portending death in some member of the family ?

EUG : Well, that is true ; but surely such an opinion is very harmless, and can hardly be quoted in justification of holy water, relics, and such like religious supernaturals ?

PHIL : I did not quote the common superstitions we are now talking of as any proof of the truth of religious supernaturals, but merely to show that persons who believe, or at least do not positively disbelieve, the one, are yet found absolutely to deny the possibility of the other. This, I say, is inconsistent in them, because if supernaturals exist at all, it is much more probable that they should be of a religious character than that they should consist of such absurdities as I collected.

EUG : As an *argumentum ad hominem*, I may admit what you say, and that, if a person has any kind of belief in any of those secular supernaturals, he cannot consistently withhold a similar degree of belief from religious supernaturals.

PHIL : My argument meant nothing more. If you treat the one class of supernaturals with indulgence, you should at least be patient with the other.

EUG : But, taking the question of religious supernaturals apart from any personal argument arising from a supposed belief in popular superstitions, do you, dear Philotheus, who have no belief in the latter, place any confidence in the former ? For instance, do you believe there is any virtue in holy water ?

PHIL : Most decidedly, I think there may be, if rightly

used. God Almighty endowed the waters of Jordan with the power of curing Naaman—he went in faith and was cleansed. Why should it seem a thing superstitious to you, if (for instance) a mother praying for a sick child should cross its forehead with holy water, in the hope that, acting in faith and under the direction of the Church, she, a Christian mother, might obtain the same benefit which Naaman, a heathen, obtained?

EUG: Naaman's cure was a miracle; such special interferences of the Almighty might have been expected before Christianity, because then God dealt more directly with men than He does now. We have no warrant for expecting miracles now.

PHIL: The question of miracles is too important a one to be discussed casually. I admit, however, that in our Church we have no experience of them; but I can by no means admit that we have no warrant for expecting them; there are many passages of Holy Writ which expressly promise them.

EUG: Surely, dear Philotheus, you do not believe that any human being can work miracles now?

PHIL: In the first place, miracles may exist without being "worked" by any human agency. The army of Sennacherib was miraculously destroyed, yet no human being worked the miracle. Uzzah was struck dead for touching the ark. These were special interferences of the Almighty, and as such miraculous; why might not such occur now? Indeed, I think I could convince you that you yourself believe in miracles.

EUG: Well, dear Philotheus, I certainly am not conscious of such a belief; but how do you make it out?

PHIL: First of all, what is a miracle?

EUG: Well, what is it? Define it yourself.

PHIL: A miracle is a special interference of Almighty God in the affairs of the world; and it may be either spontaneous, or He may be moved thereto by the prayer of faith.

EUG: I do not quite understand you.

PHIL: My meaning is this;—God governs the world by His general providence; He has appointed the laws by

which all is regulated ; these laws, though wonderful in the highest degree, we do not call miraculous ; but we have also a belief in a special providence, that is, events take place which we call providential, by which is meant, I presume, that they are caused by a special interference of the Almighty,—now these special interferences of the Almighty are, in fact, miracles.

EUG : I understand you ; but I should not have called such events by that name.

PHIL : Answers to prayer again,—these have the nature of miracles. If you have a sick friend, and he recovers by the use of suitable medicines, this is no miracle, but an event in the ordinary course of God's providence ; but if you pray for his recovery, and he recovers in consequence of your prayer, this is a special interference, and so, miraculous. It seems to me that, if we believe that prayer to God is ever answered, we must believe in present miracles.

EUG : I should not have called answer to prayer a miracle ;—I ask God Almighty for a particular blessing. He accords it to me ; what is there miraculous in that ? It is in the ordinary course of His dealings with us.

PHIL : A miracle is not the less a miracle because it is prayed for. If we pray for rain and God sends it, surely it is a miracle, just as when Elisha prayed that it might not rain, and his prayer was answered ? Many of the miracles of the New Testament were answers to prayer.

EUG : But you can never be sure that the event for which you have prayed for has happened in consequence of your prayer.

PHIL : That is most true ; some miracles are so sudden and so striking as to leave no room for doubt, whilst others seem to be calculated only for the eye of faith. "Stretch forth thy hand," and the immediate restoration of the withered member, seems intended to astonish and, as it were, force belief ; whereas, "Thy son liveth," and the subsequent discovery that at that time the Centurion's son began to amend, seems less surprising ; but, to the eye of faith, it was no less a miracle than the other,

although cavillers might have doubted whether the recovery was the result of our Saviour's assurance.

EUG: We know that both these were miracles, because we are told they were.

PHIL: Certainly; but I quoted and contrasted them in order to show that a miracle may be not the less a miracle, although you may not be certain that it did not happen from natural causes. It may be one of the peculiarities of modern providences (or miracles) that they are in a manner hidden, that you cannot be sure of them: but surely if prayer is ever answered—that is, if the Almighty changes the course of events at your prayer—it is a miraculous interference, and to that extent you yourself believe in miracles?

EUG: If your definition is true, I do; but I was doubting your definition.

PHIL: Well, I confess myself unable to give you a better; I repeat, therefore, that any special interference of the Almighty to change the ordinary course of His general laws, whether in answer to prayer or not, is, in my judgment, a miracle; and, to recur to your question about holy water, why should it seem to you impossible that God should bless the use of it, and make it available for cure or protection, if used in simple faith?

EUG: That God may bless the simplest means used for cure is a proposition I am far from denying; but holy water is used superstitiously and as a charm.

PHIL: If it is used superstitiously and as a charm, or in any other way than in humble reliance upon God's mercy, it is not only useless but wicked; but it is of its religious use of which I was speaking; and if it is admitted that God can and does answer the prayer of faith, and that frequently by outward means, I think it is not much to say that such outward actions as the use of holy water, are not to be put aside as necessarily superstitious.

ABANDONMENT OF OUR REASONING POWERS.

PHILOTHEUS AND EUGENIA.

EUG : If I understand you rightly, dear Philotheus, a Catholic, in order to justify the doctrines he holds, or the practices he adopts, has only to say "the Church holds them,"—"the Church adopts them,"—"the Church permits them"?

PHIL : That is all that is necessary to satisfy *himself* about them, and myriads of Catholics have no other reason for their faith or usages. A Catholic believes the Church to be the organ of God's revelation to us, and therefore he confides in her and obeys her.

EUG : So I understand ; but I wish to know how a Catholic can justify that entire abandonment of the reasoning powers which is involved in taking, upon trust, whatever the Church may say, however impossible it may be?

PHIL : If a Catholic were justifying himself to an *infidel*, he would endeavour to prove to him, in the first place, the probability that there are many things which our senses and mental powers are not able to grasp, or intended to grasp ; then, that a revelation from God would probably relate to such matters, and to things not discoverable by ourselves ; and then, if so, that a revelation from God ought not to be tested by our limited notions.

EUG : I rather meant, how would he justify himself to a Protestant, who, like himself, believed in a revelation?

PHIL : To a Protestant—that is, to such as we are likely to meet with in England—his task would be much

simpler. He would say, "tu quoque," you abandon your reasoning powers as much as I do.

EUG: But surely that would not be true? A Protestant exercises his private judgment upon the doctrines he believes.

PHIL: He thinks he does, but he does not.

EUG: How can that be? I thought that was the very mark which distinguished a Protestant from a Catholic.

PHIL: If you will go with me step by step, I will show you that it is perfectly true.

EUG: Proceed then, for I am highly interested, and shall listen with the greatest attention.

PHIL: Well then;—Protestants and Catholics are agreed in this—that, before the coming of Christ, the wisest and best of men had been utterly unable, by the exercise of human reason, to discover the mystery of the origin, present condition, and future prospects of mankind,—that human reason had utterly failed to explain the origin of evil, or to prove the immortality of the soul.

EUG: Certainly that is so.

PHIL: Protestants and Catholics are also agreed that, in this state of things, God Almighty, thought fit to grant a new revelation to mankind, by means of the incarnation and teaching of Jesus Christ. Farther, they would also agree, that it might have been expected, *a priori*, that such revelation would consist of matters contrary to the preconceptions of man, and very different from what his reasoning powers might have led him to expect.

EUG: So far both are agreed.

PHIL: I think you will admit also that they would agree in this,—that it is the duty of man unhesitatingly to receive this Divine revelation, and to submit to it and obey it, whatever it may be?

EUG: Certainly, as soon as he is quite satisfied that it is a revelation from God.

PHIL: Now, I am not quite certain that you will at first sight perceive, that neither Protestants nor Catholics allow themselves to test the alleged revelation by its contents?

EUG: I do not quite see your meaning.

PHIL : I mean that neither one nor the other would be deterred from receiving a revelation by the unexpected nature of the things revealed, if they were satisfied with the credentials of the messenger.

EUG : Yes ; I suppose this would be so.

PHIL : Well, then, is it not plain that a Protestant abandons his reasoning powers, precisely in the same way as a Catholic, in regard to the subject matter revealed ?

EUG : Would not a Protestant's objection be this,—that a Catholic abandons his reasoning powers to a human authority, which requires him to believe and do things incredible and repulsive in themselves ?

PHIL : When you speak of human authority, you should consider that the revelation of God, though Divine, does not come to us directly from God, but through the intervention of human instruments ; neither Catholics nor Protestants can read it in the sun ; a Protestant therefore must be indebted to some human authority for his knowledge of revelation, as much as a Catholic, to which authority he equally abandons his reason.

EUG : Surely a Protestant *exercises* his reasoning powers, viz., upon the Bible, whilst a Catholic abandons his to the Church.

PHIL : That is a fallacy. Protestants (always intending such Protestants as we meet with in this country) do not exercise their reasoning powers upon the matters contained in the Bible. Whatever they find there, they receive unhesitatingly and undoubtingly ; they do not allow themselves to question one iota of its contents. Their reasoning powers are only exercised to ascertain what the Bible says ; but when this is found, they accept it, whatever it may be. Protestants accept the testimony of the Bible as implicitly as Catholics accept the testimony of the Church.

EUG : Still, I cannot but think that Catholics abandon their reason in a different sense from that in which Protestants do so. For instance, Catholics submit to worship the Virgin Mary and the Saints, and to believe in Transubstantiation and Purgatory, and other things, merely because fallible men say it is right to do so.

PHIL: The Protestant believes much more astounding things than these upon no better authority. He believes the history of the fall of man and of the flood; he believes the miracles in Egypt, the crossing the Red Sea, the swallowing up of Korah and his company; that Enoch was translated to Heaven without dying; that Elijah was carried to Heaven in a chariot of fire; that Elisha made iron swim; that Shadrach, Meshach, and Abednego came unhurt out of the fire; that Jonah was swallowed by a fish and remained alive in it;—farther, he believes that Jesus Christ was born of a Virgin, and was crucified, and that He was God;—and all this, and much more, he believes on the authority of the Bible.

EUG: But the Bible is the inspired word of God, and was revealed by Him.

PHIL: How does a Protestant know that the Bible contains God's revelations, or that those who wrote it were inspired by Him?

EUG: It has been handed down to us from the time of the Apostles and others who wrote it.

PHIL: That does not prove its authenticity. In the eye of a Protestant it must have come down to him through the hands of fallible men, and may have been curtailed, altered, or added to; what proof has his reason of its genuineness? Moreover, many Protestants have disputed and do dispute, the authenticity of various parts of it.

EUG: The Bible, in its present state, was certified to be the true word of God by a Council of the Church, (was it not?) at the end of the fourth century.

PHIL: Exactly; and thus a Protestant is obliged to have recourse for the Bible itself to the very authority which he undervalues in other respects as being that of fallible men, and which authority indeed he follows only so far as he pleases, by rejecting parts which they received.

EUG: Might not a Protestant say that he does not take the Bible on the authority of that Council, that the Council gave testimony respecting it, and that that testimony is confirmed by its internal evidence?

PHIL: Fortunately, the bulk of English Protestants (happily inconsistent in so doing,) do take the Bible—that

is, such parts of it as they receive—bodily, on the authority of that Council. There are, however, others Protestants who allow themselves the license of testing the evidence of the Council by the “internal evidence,”—that is to say, by the contents of the Bible; and the consequence is, that many of them, as indeed Luther did, reject various parts as, in their judgment, no part of the Divine revelation.

EUG: I have no sympathy with such Protestants.

PHIL: Well then, I think you must admit that a Protestant, in unhesitatingly believing everything contained in the Bible, whatever it is, does, in fact, abandon his reasoning power to that extent as absolutely as a Catholic?

EUG: It seems that he does.

PHIL: It is plain also that a Protestant does not allow himself to be staggered in his confidence in the Bible by the wonderful and unexpected nature of its contents?

EUG: That is also plain.

PHIL: He agrees with the Catholic, therefore, that you must not refuse to hear the messenger on account of the abstract improbability or unexpected nature of the message?

EUG: It seems so.

PHIL: May we not, therefore, deduce this conclusion also,—that as a Protestant does not allow himself to be repelled from the acceptance of the Bible, by reason of its containing wonderful and incomprehensible matters, so, a Catholic ought not to allow himself to be repelled from the Church by its teaching or permitting doctrines and practices which he might not have anticipated?

EUG: Yes. If the Church be really the organ of Revelation to us, we must submit to its teaching as absolutely as we submit our judgment to the plain facts of the Bible; the great question is, which is the organ of Revelation to us,—the Church or the Bible?

PHIL: You are right, that *is* the great question, and, as you must also see, the previous question, the preliminary question. Till this is settled, disputes about doctrines must be utterly unavailing. So, having come to a point of agreement, we will discontinue our conversation for the present.

READING THE BIBLE.

“We are bound in fairness to say that so long as the Dissenter teaches his scholars to read the Bible, he establishes in the mind of the child a common ground of appeal...the Romanist does no such thing : he inculcates no reverence for the Holy Scriptures, he keeps the Bible as much as possible out of the hands and from the knowledge of the people ; to support Romish education, is to be accessory to an open act of contempt against the Word of God.”—*English Review*, March, 1849 ; Art. “Comm. of Council.”

PHILOTHEUS AND EUGENIA.

PHIL : Really, such representations as these are not fair, especially from a Review representing the opinions of the High Church party.

EUG : It is hard language, no doubt ; but it is to be regretted that the Roman Catholics give so much ground for it.

PHIL : Those can know little of the Catholic system who imagine that Catholics are wanting in respect for the Holy Scriptures ;—in what respect do you conceive that Roman Catholics give ground for such representations ?

EUG : They continually speak disparagingly of the Bible. There was an article in the *Dublin Review* in October, 1847, upon a book of M. Malou's, in which the Holy Scriptures were depreciated and spoken of as mere dry historical detail. These are the things which account for, if they do not justify, the language you object to.

PHIL : I cannot believe that the Bible can intentionally be spoken of disparagingly by any writer of note in the Catholic Church ; but, even if there were objectionable expressions to be found in some casual article of a periodical journal, that is scarcely a sufficient ground for charging a want of reverence upon Catholics generally. Should you think it fair, if the Church of England in

general were charged by Roman Catholics with all the bitterness of Protestant magazines?

EUG : No ; but, at the same time, it is to be regretted that any Catholics should use such language.

PHIL : I have said, dear Eugenia, I can scarcely believe that they do ; but I will read the article you mean, and find the expressions of which you complain. I think they cannot have been meant to be used in disparagement of the Holy Scriptures.

EUG : Well, I really should be glad if you would.

[*Conversation discontinued.*]

[*Conversation renewed.*]

PHIL : I have now read the article you spoke of, and we will, if you like, continue our conversation.

EUG : Well, did I misrepresent it in saying that it spoke of the Bible in disparaging and depreciating terms?

PHIL : I found, I assure you, dear Eugenia, nothing whatsoever deserving such a character ; the misuse of the Bible is deprecated, and it is described as being of itself a mere dead letter, that is, unless properly understood.

EUG : I cannot recall the passages ; but when I read the article I felt that it was undervaluing the Bible.

PHIL : The article does say, certainly, that the indiscriminate circulation of the Bible is injurious, that the reading of the Scriptures by uninstructed persons may do them more harm than good, and it strenuously opposes the notion that the world is to be converted by circulating printed Bibles.

EUG : Is not that to undervalue it ? How is it possible that the inspired word of God can, under any circumstances, be productive of evil ? It is God's gift to man, and surely should not be withheld from him ? If he misuses it, that is his own fault ; but our duty is plain—I say, Circulate, circulate, circulate.

PHIL : Before we proceed, let me show you some quotations from the article in the *Dublin Review* which displeased you :—

“ From the case of the Jews we may learn how possible it is to read the Scriptures, and to reap no other fruit from the study than heightened responsibility and *aggravated condemnation*. ”

“On the other hand, we find melancholy proof that the Bibles indiscriminately scattered through the land may be rendered *instrumental to the most wicked and infernal purposes.*”

“The book, the chapter, and the verse are unblushingly referred to, whence a disastrous and diabolical chemistry *extracts the poison of blasphemy and unbelief.*”

“People ought to be instructed how possible it is to read the Scriptures, not only without edification, *but with moral and spiritual detriment.*”

“‘Take heed how ye hear,’ was our Saviour’s solemn admonition ; and from every pulpit I wish I could hear pronounced the seasonable and salutary warning, ‘*Beware how ye read.*’”

These, I conclude, are the kind of passages which you disliked ?

EUG : Yes ; that is one kind of depreciation. These passages assume that God’s gifts can do harm.

PHIL : Now, dear Eugenia, do you think you can muster patience to go with me step by step in this most vital inquiry ?

EUG : Well, I think I can.

PHIL : First, then, let me ask you, Are there no parts of the Holy Scriptures which you would willingly withhold from the eye or ear of your children ? Are there no passages which, if you were reading to them you would feel disposed to skip, or which, when read in Church, you are inclined to hope they are not attending to ? Are there no chapters which you would pass over altogether ?

EUG : Yes ; there are, certainly, parts of the Mosaic law, relating to matters not fit for children to know, and allusions to crimes and immoralities which it could do them no good to hear about.

PHIL : Then, notwithstanding your general rule of circulating, you acknowledge a propriety of withholding parts of Holy Scripture at times ?

EUG : Yes, from children.

PHIL : If you were endeavouring to convert a heathen, are there not some parts of Holy Scripture which you would desire to withhold from him at first, as being such as would scandalize him, or at least he might misunderstand or misapply : for instance, the failings of some of those who were, in reality, God’s inspired Saints—David, Solomon, &c. ?

EUG: I do not know that I should.

PHIL: Suppose now, that you had an infidel staying in your house, and a Bible upon your table,—suppose you found him continually turning it over and selecting passages for ridicule and infidel observation,—should you not feel disposed to remove it out of his reach, out of the way of such desecration?

EUG: That is an extreme case.

PHIL: It may be an extreme case; but should you not be acting rightly and reverentially in putting it out of the reach of unseemly jests—nay more, should you not be doing him a service by so doing?

EUG: I think I should act as you suggest; but I am not quite clear that I should be right in doing so.

PHIL: What then do you understand by our Saviour's precept not to cast pearls before swine; does it not mean that you are not unduly to present holy things to the observation of unfit persons?

EUG: My difficulty is this—if I admit that I may exercise any discretion as to who is or who is not to be encouraged to read the Bible, I see you will say that I have no right to find fault with others for exercising their discretion on the same subject.

PHIL: Do not, dear Eugenia, be deterred from making an obvious admission, by the fear of what may be deduced from it. Consider the matter well, and if the proposition be true, admit it candidly, without reference to consequences. The present proposition is—that putting the Bible into the hands of an infidel, who has shown a disposition to scoff at and ridicule it, would be like casting pearls before swine, and therefore should not be done.

EUG: Well, I think I must admit that.

PHIL: Another instance;—suppose there were a body of persons employing themselves in selecting passages from Holy Scripture, in order, by misrepresenting them, to undermine the morals of the people; and suppose the people, in some time of violence and outrage, to be but too ready to listen to them, to be eager to adopt the infernal ideas suggested to them,—would you at such a time

circulate amongst them the very book from which, with perverted minds, they were drawing their own destruction?

EUG: To be candid, I think I should not.

PHIL: Now then, read once more the passages I have taken from the article in the *Dublin Review*, and say whether they seem to you to be disparaging, except so far as they allege that the Bible is capable of being misused, which it can be no real disparagement to say of anything however holy or sacred.

EUG: In this point of view they certainly have not the same aspect as that in which I first saw them.

PHIL: I am not surprised at your admission; for, though they are all taken from the article in question, they are, in fact, quotations from the works of an amiable and learned Bishop of the English Church, viz., Bishop Jebb, whom no one would charge with a desire to undervalue the Holy Scriptures.

EUG: But there are other expressions used in that article in regard to the Bible, which seem to depose it from its position of eminence amongst Christians, and give it only some inferior position: for instance, it is called a "mere material book, not possessed of life, and unable by its own power so much as to propose itself for belief;" again, "we believe that the Scriptures are not fitted to resolve absolutely and definitely any controversy when they are separate from the principle of authority;" again, "we believe that God never commanded all the faithful to read the Holy Bible, and to extract from it for themselves a knowledge of Revelation."

PHIL: Language of this kind is not peculiar to Roman Catholics. For instance:—

"It is from Scripture, no doubt, that such a view (of the Gospel) must be gained; *but will any one venture to say that from Scripture such a clear and commanding view as is necessary for a teacher can be easily gained by men of moderate capacity?*"—H. J. ROSE.

"Holy Scripture is sufficient as containing all things necessary to salvation, but *not sufficient* to prove its own *inspiration, authenticity, genuineness, nor the purity of the text, nor its own interpretation.*"—MANNING'S *Rule of Faith*, App. 84.

"Their differences prove at least this, that Scripture is *not the clear expositor of its own meaning.*"—ID., p. 36.

EUG: That Archdeacon Manning and others have written such passages, does not justify the use of them.

PHIL: Of course not. I merely wanted to show you that such a view of the Scriptures is not confined to Roman Catholics.

EUG: There is one of my quotations from the *Dublin Review*—viz., that which says that “*God never commanded all the faithful to read the Bible*,”—which I should like to hear explained, because that looks like discouraging people from reading it, which is what is charged upon the Roman Catholics.

PHIL: There is a large body of Christians who hold that the individual reading of the Bible is the true way of arriving at a knowledge of the revelation made by God to man; they say that God has given us His inspired word, and that every Christian who prays for the assistance of the Holy Spirit will be aided in understanding it.

EUG: And this the Roman Catholics deny?

PHIL: They do; and so does the Church of England—it affirms, in the 20th Article, that “the Church hath authority in controversies of faith,” which means, if it means anything, that if there should arise disputes regarding Christian doctrine, the Church may authoritatively determine them. This, it is plain, is not consistent with the idea that each is to read and form his own judgment.

EUG: But many persons in the Church of England deny that the Church has any such authority.

PHIL: They do; but it is difficult to see how they reconcile their opinions with the declared doctrine of the English Church.

EUG: Surely the Catholics hold a very different doctrine on this subject from the English Church?

PHIL: The Catholics hold this: that our Blessed Saviour established a society called the Church to teach and transmit His will; that, in early times of this society, some of the Apostles, and other inspired men, wrote accounts of our Saviour’s ministry upon earth, of the proceedings of the early Church, and also various letters addressed either to individuals or to bodies of Christians, upon a variety of subjects; that these writings, which

some centuries after were collected together into one book, form the New Testament; that these, being written by inspired men, contain, providentially, indications of, or allusions to, all the important doctrines of Christianity, but that they do so incidentally, and in a manner not always obvious to moderate capacities; that, in part, it is a relation of facts, as in the Gospels, and in part argumentative and exhortatory, as in the Epistles; that all the facts of our Saviour's life are not contained therein, nor all His teaching; and that the arguments and exhortations contained in the Epistles are necessarily confined to such matters as arose and required notice at the time;—farther, that the Holy Scriptures, the Old and New Testament, are, in parts, very difficult of comprehension, and are therefore to be read in submission to the judgment of the Church, which, at the same time that it has handed them down to us, has handed down a traditional interpretation of them; and, finally, that they are a treasury from which the Church may draw, but that they are not, and never were, intended to be submitted to the private judgment of all or any individual Christians.

EUG: They admit the Bible to be the inspired word of God, and yet they withhold it from individual Christians?

PHIL: I do not understand that they withhold it from any one who is fit to use it. The question between them and the Protestants is not, whether the Bible should be read or not, but whether it should be read by all,—good and bad, young and old, wise and ignorant,—whether it should be read by those who hate it, as well as those who love it, by those who are likely to misunderstand it as well as by those who have been duly instructed and carefully guarded against misapprehension. The Bible consists of words and sentences,—rightly understood, they are the word of God; wrongly understood, they are not.

EUG: I still cannot help recurring to my original view, that, being the inspired word of God and His gift, it may be trusted, it will work His will.

PHIL: Medicine is the gift of God; but would you trust it to inexperienced hands, on the ground that, being His gift, it may be trusted and can do no harm?

EUG: No; but the Bible is a higher gift of God than anything else you can name. You cannot compare it with anything; everything else shrinks in comparison. Surely it must have been meant for all?

PHIL: And yet for at least 300 years it was scattered about, here a fragment and there a fragment, having no peculiar mark by which it could be distinguished from other uninspired writings; then, when collected by the Church, it remained for upwards of 1,000 years, known indeed, studied and taught by the learned, but inaccessible to the unlearned, and unread by the millions upon millions who lived and died good Christians notwithstanding. Till the invention of paper and printing, scarcely 300 years ago, reading the Bible for themselves was not practicable for the great body of Christians; is it probable then, if reading the Bible was the means by which it was God's will that men should be made Christians, that He would have allowed it to remain for 1,500 years an impracticable means?

EUG: The invention of paper and printing may have been a providential mode by which God may have made that a right and a duty, which, before that time, was not so, because not practicable.

PHIL: This is plain—that, before those inventions, converts to Christianity had nothing else to look to but the teaching of the Church. Your supposition is, that the printing of the Bible, and the translation of it into living languages, superseded the authority of the Church?

EUG: The view I am suggesting is, that as reading the Bible became practicable, so it became less necessary that the world should take religion at second-hand.

PHIL: Should you call it taking medicine at second-hand, if you took it on the advice of an experienced physician, instead of culling simples for yourself or reading the *Pharmacopeia*?

EUG: Now, surely, you are undervaluing the Bible, the admitted work of God, in comparing it to the *Pharmacopeia*, a mere human work?

PHIL: The herbs and flowers which God has destined for the healing of our bodily ills are as much His work

as the Bible is, and, like the Bible, are not to be heedlessly used. I do not undervalue the Bible in affirming that it is not suited for a purpose for which it was not intended; but I value it, and Roman Catholics value it, far more than those who multiply it till it comes to be degraded to all sorts of vile uses, till its very cheapness causes it to be held cheap. In my judgment, to teach the people that they are to read their Bibles and judge for themselves, is to facilitate and encourage the growth of every kind of heresy and schism, in the same way that the use of medicinal herbs by ignorant persons would indubitably produce disease and death. All heretics and schismatics join in the cry, "The Bible, and the Bible only," because they know that thus, confutation becomes impossible. This consideration alone might make people doubtful of their maxims.

EUG: But Catholics have been known to burn Bibles: surely that argues hostility to it?

PHIL: There have been cases in which Catholics have burnt or otherwise destroyed the *English authorised translation*, which they, rightly or wrongly, believe to be an incorrect translation; when, indeed, they find a society (the Bible Society), composed of every class of heretics and schismatics which this kingdom contains, pertinaciously thrusting a version of the Holy Scriptures, which they do not acknowledge, amongst their people, in order to shake their faith, what else can they do with it?

EUG: They certainly could not do worse with it if it was a book full of blasphemy and immorality.

PHIL: Consider for an instant;—a Catholic priest finds a copy of the Anglican translation with one of his people; it has been pressed upon him by some district visitor; he knows, or thinks he knows, that it is unfairly translated, and that in points likely to mislead; the man to whom it has been given asks what he is to do with it—what more respectful to the book, of which it professes to be a translation, could be done than to burn it? To keep it and not to use it would be absurd; to use it would be dangerous; to return it to the donor would only be helping its distribution—what then remains, but to make waste-paper

of it or burn it? and there are more reasons against the former of these modes of disposing of it than the latter. What do you think a member of the Bible Society would do with a Catholic Bible of which he did not approve?

EUG: Well, I daresay he would burn it; but would he not have more reason? Are not the Catholic translations false?

PHIL: I am not competent to express an opinion on the relative correctness of the two translations; and learned men amongst Protestants would admit that the complaints made by Catholics against the Anglican Bible are not without foundation; but if the Catholic believes that the Protestant Bible is a misrepresentation of the true book, you will admit that he is quite as right to burn it as a Protestant would be to burn a Catholic book?

EUG: Well, I think I must admit that; but, to return to our main subject, your opinion seems to be that there is a fundamental difference between Catholics, and others who think as they do, and Protestants.

PHIL: There is. All Protestants claim the right of private judgment on the text of Scripture; all Catholics are for taking their religion from the Church, and reading the Bible in submission to her authority.

EUG: Then, it seems to be a question, Church or Bible?

PHIL: No; it is a question whether the Bible alone, without the Church, is to supersede the Church with the Bible. Now, as our Saviour says a great deal about the Church, and belonging to it, and obeying it, and not one word about any book to be written which was to supersede it, I cannot but think that those who adhere to Church and Bible are more in accordance with His will than those who talk of "Bible only."

EUG: Well, our conversation has extended to a great length, and you must be tired of so unpromising a pupil.

PHIL: Not at all. I shall be quite contented if I have satisfied you that those who judiciously *withhold the Bible from unprepared hands are not fairly chargeable with being wanting in reverence.*

PAID AGENTS OF CHARITY.

PHILOTHEUS AND EUGENIA.

EUG: In speaking disparagingly, dear Philotheus, of paid nurses, paid almoners, and paid agents of charity of any kind, do you mean merely that they are in general inefficient persons who are so employed, or do you mean that the fact of their being paid interferes with their usefulness?

PHIL: I have no doubt that there is many a paid dispenser of charity who may be disposed to be kind and considerate, and to do his duty faithfully; it is not personally that I disparage them; but I mean, that the fact that they are hired so affects their position in the eyes of the parties relieved, as to hinder the feeling of gratitude, and even in some cases, to excite distaste and anger.

EUG: But why should this be? If the person you trust with alms, is honest, and does his duty, he surely stands in the place of the real donor, and should be the recipient of some part at least of the gratitude which may be due?

PHIL: It appears so at first sight; but practically it is not so; and I think I see reasons which may sufficiently account for it.

EUG: Well, I should much like to know what they are.

PHIL: In the first place, let us consider the fact—is it true that paid agents of charity are undervalued by the parties relieved?

EUG: I have heard you say that they are; but I should like to know what proof there is of it?

Phil: The fact shows itself in the almost universal

grumbling and complaining which follows all vicarious distributions or services ; no one is satisfied ; the deserts of one have been overlooked, others have been unduly preferred. Who ever heard of any grateful feeling from a recipient of parochial charity towards the overseer ; and how common are the complaints of hospital nurses ?

EUG : I should not call parish alms charity ; and hospital nurses become callous probably from habit.

PHIL : It is true, parish alms are not private charity, but they are national charity, millions of which are distributed every year without exciting one expression of gratitude ; this I believe to be owing to the entire absence of any religious element in its mode of distribution, and to the fact that the agents of distribution are hired and paid. As to hospital nurses, how is it that Sisters of Charity, who are proverbially gentle, do not become callous ?

EUG : I should like to know your remedy for the barrenness of parish alms ; but, to leave that point for the present, and assuming that hospital nurses are hard-hearted and parish overseers harsh, how do you account for it ?

PHIL : Hired nurses look to their pay for their remuneration, and measure their services by it. "It is not my place," would never be heard from a Sister of Charity ; nor, on the other hand, "I have a right to it," from a patient attended by a Sister. Tenderness is fed by gratitude ; and as hired nurses get none, their services become rigid.

EUG : I see. Then you think that the callousness of hired nurses is no individual peculiarity, but the result of their services being coldly received ?

PHIL : Precisely so. A harsh nurse might become a tender Sister of Charity, if her services were received with gratitude, and especially if religious motives were substituted for a salary.

EUG : I do not quite see why there should not be gratitude towards a nurse paid by others.

PHIL : The cause of the want of gratitude is the knowledge, on the part of the person benefited, that it is

not personal regard or any charitable feeling which produces the service, but a money payment. The relative position of the parties is determined by the fact of payment, and then, as there is no gratitude to excite tenderness, no higher motive or principle arises than, at best, duty. Again, it is not tenderness alone which charms, but the reflection that it is without earthly motive, and that you have no claim to it.

EUG: I am still rather hard to believe that there can be no gratitude towards a vicarious dispenser of charity. Take the case of a clergyman or a district visitor: does not charity through them excite gratitude?

PHIL: They are the strongest cases you could produce; but the result is the same. If the distributor joins to the gift *any self-sacrifice of his own*, he will attract gratitude to himself; if not, he will not only get no gratitude, but probably abuse. It was only last Christmas that the clergyman of my parish at S—— refused to distribute meat for me to the poor, because, he said, he got more abuse than thanks.

EUG: How do you account for that?

PHIL: He was obliged to select his objects, and, in selecting, to omit some; they of course grumbled, and those he included knew the gift was not his, and never dreamt of any obligation to him; so he positively refused to have anything more to do with it.

EUG: But that was wrong in him?

PHIL: Of course it was; but his position is unfortunate. An English clergyman is not looked upon as a person who has made any personal sacrifice for the poor—rather as a person who has got a good place—so that the gift wanted the blessing of some degree of self-sacrifice on the part of the giver. If the hand which distributed had been that of some self-denying monk, the gift would not have been grumbled at.

EUG: I am still at a loss for an entire explanation of the phenomenon you mention, that vicarious services produce no gratitude unless the party rendering the service contributes to it;—your theory does not quite satisfy me.

PHIL: I am not surprised, because there is one other ingredient in the feeling of the recipient of charity which I have not yet mentioned.

EUG: What is that?

PHIL: There is a degree of *humiliation* in the reception of charity. This, however, is in a great measure removed when it comes from the hand of genuine sympathy; but from the hand of a hired agent, there is nothing to dulcify it—it is left bare—your distresses are exposed to his indifferent gaze.

EUG: That certainly is an important ingredient, and, I must admit, a probable one.

PHIL: It is an undoubted one. Do you remember what the Nuns of the Good Shepherd told us—that their penitents would bear anything from them, and were peaceable, tractable, and grateful; but that they would not bear the interference of servants?

EUG: Yes, that was so.

PHIL: The explanation is plain—the penitents must feel that innocent women, who dedicate their lives to doing good to such as they, cannot altogether despise them; that it must be a real sympathy for them which induces them to it; but they are not so sure of this in regard to paid servants—they suspect that they are despised, and their spirit rises against it.

EUG: Then you would think a penitentiary superintended by nuns likely to do more good than one conducted by lay persons, however earnest?

PHIL: Than one conducted by persons who were not making any personal sacrifice. For the same reason, a *school* conducted by Christian Brothers, a *hospital* tended by Sisters of Charity, an *asylum* superintended by nuns, would all be better managed, would do more good, and produce more gratitude than similar establishments under paid managers, however conscientious and exemplary they might be.

EUG: But do you not think there may be equal success in a Protestant school, hospital, or asylum, where the inmates are well cared for at the cost of charitable persons?

PHIL: No, certainly not. The motives, for instance, of the reformation of penitents are various—they may be the highest, such as a determination to please God by a new course of conduct; but a very common, though imperfect motive, is, to gratify those who have taken so much pains to help and amend them, and to avoid disappointing them.

EUG: Would they not have the same desire to gratify their benefactors in either case?

PHIL: No. They must know, in the case of nuns, that they look for no other earthly reward but that of seeing the success of their efforts. Now there is no feeling more universal than that of *an indisposition to disappoint*, even in trifling matters; this feeling must act most strongly upon penitents who have been rescued (so to speak) by nuns; to disappoint *them*, would be to deprive them of their only reward: whereas, the officials in a paid establishment have done their duty, and have been paid for it; and success, though gratifying, seems less necessary to support them in their task, seeing it is not their only reward.

Nov., 1849.

PURGATORY.

PHILOTHEUS AND EUGENIA.

PHIL: The departure of our dear E. has forced upon me once more, as I cannot doubt it has upon you, thoughts on the state of the departed; suppose we interchange them?

EUG: Most willingly, dear Philotheus; for, believe me, there is nothing you say which I do not think of over and over again; but I am dull, so you must be a little patient with me if I do not at once understand you, or if I express my own difficulties clumsily.

PHIL: All my desire, dearest Eugenia, is to feel at liberty to talk to you; as to the result of what I say, I am content to leave that to God.

EUG: Well then, what point in particular is it regarding which you wish to consider the state of the departed?

PHIL: In one word, Purgatory.

EUG: I do not deny that I am, perhaps, prejudiced against the doctrine of Purgatory; but I will endeavour to give my attention to all you have to say.

PHIL: First, then, we shall both agree that heaven is the place to which the good, and the good only, will go; and that nothing impure can enter there.

EUG: Certainly, so far we are entirely agreed.

PHIL: Also, we shall agree that hell is the place where the wicked go, and that those who go there will remain with the devil and his angels for ever.

EUG: This, too, I concur in.

PHIL: Now, you are aware that it is the doctrine of the Catholic Church that there is a third or intermediate

place, in which the souls of those who have departed this life in an imperfect, though not in a wilfully wicked state, are purged and purified, and rendered fit for that heaven to which, by God's mercy, they are to be admitted.

EUG : Yes ; this is what I understand by the doctrine of Purgatory.

PHIL : Now tell me, in the first place, what there is in this doctrine inconsistent with the wisdom and goodness of God ? Why should it seem improbable to you that God, in His mercy, should devise a means of saving from everlasting punishment those who may have departed from the flesh with an imperfect repentance, or who may have been guilty of minor sins unrepented of and forgotten ?

EUG : But, dear Philotheus, you will agree with me that the question is, not what God might have done, but what He has done.

PHIL : True ; but as I am only considering the *probability* of a place of purification or temporary punishment, not proving it, it is important to determine whether there is anything in the supposition contrary to the known attributes of God ; now I think you will admit that there is nothing contradictory either to His mercy, goodness, or justice, in the supposition ?

EUG : If I could be satisfied that Purgatory has been revealed, or even that it is reconcilable with what has been revealed, in the Holy Scriptures, there is nothing, I admit, in the idea itself that is repulsive.

PHIL : I counted upon your admitting thus far. Now let us apply the doctrine to a particular case ;—suppose a child, old enough to know right from wrong, commits sin ; suppose the child not to be a wilfully wicked child, but to have been guilty of childish faults of anger or disobedience, or to have committed some other hasty and unpremeditated sin ; if that child should die suddenly, without time for sorrow or repentance, is it not reasonable to suppose that God may have provided a means by which it may be saved from hell fire, and made fit for heaven, even by means of temporary punishment ?

EUG : I repeat, there is nothing repulsive to me in the idea of a state of purification, nor can I deny that it would

be in accordance with God's mercy that a child dying, as you suppose, should be saved from eternal damnation, even by means of punishment; but it seems to me that the Holy Scriptures could not fail to indicate such a scheme if it existed.

PHIL: I will show you presently that the Holy Scriptures are not altogether silent in regard to an intermediate state of purification; let me, however, first, put another case to you;—suppose a man who has lived in the world, and who in the earlier part of his life indulged in habitual sin,—suppose also that in his later years he has discontinued his former sins, that he regrets having committed them, and sincerely repents of such as he remembers,—what reason has he for supposing that those many sins formerly committed, and of which he has not repented, because they have passed altogether out of his memory, will be forgiven, merely because he has forgotten them? And if they still remain against him, surely it is a consolatory thought that God, in His mercy, has provided a mode by which that debt may be paid, short of hell fire for ever?

EUG: Might not God pardon these sins without any such contrivance as Purgatory? Are not the merits of our Saviour abundantly sufficient to cover the sins of the whole world? Why should any punishment be necessary?

PHIL: *Sufficient*, no doubt; but we have no reason to suppose that any sins are entirely pardoned without repentance; and if forgotten, it is plain they are not repented of.

EUG: Well, but I am anxious to know what indications there are of this doctrine in the Holy Scriptures?

PHIL: I must first remind you that it is a mistake to suppose that we may expect to find a plain statement of every doctrine of Christianity in the Holy Scriptures. The Gospels and Acts are histories of the events of our Saviour's life, and of the first establishment of the Church; the Epistles are letters written upon a variety of occasions, and on particular subjects, and many doctrines and practices are mentioned only incidentally.

EUG: Yes; I know that is the view taken of the Holy Scriptures by you and those who think with you.

PHIL : Be assured of this, dear Eugenia, it is the true one,—a view too plain and obvious to be doubted by any one who will even cursorily examine it; but we will not interrupt our present inquiry by a discussion of that subject,—it is worthy of a separate consideration,—so I proceed to show some of the incidental allusions, in the Holy Scriptures, to an intermediate state of purification.

EUG : Before you do this, can you in a few words tell me what the Catholic doctrine of Purgatory is?

PHIL : Catholics hold, I believe,—that although God Almighty may have pardoned sin in consideration of the merits of Christ, and so saved us from its eternal consequences, He will chasten us for our profit,—that though pardoned, we are made perfect through suffering of some kind,—and that this fatherly correction, if not administered in this world, will be in the next,—and that by it we are purified and made fit for heaven;—they also hold that venial sins—that is, faults not deserving eternal punishment—are also purged away in like manner, by loss of some kind, either here or hereafter; and that the place where such correction or preparation will take place, if not here, will be in one of God's distant mansions which the Church calls Purgatory.

EUG : Then Purgatory is not part of hell?

PHIL : Far from it; it is rather part of heaven,—those only going there who are to arrive at heaven at last.

EUG : Now then for your scriptural indications of this doctrine?

PHIL : I have put them on paper for you, and here they are :—

Matt. xii. 32 : “It shall not be forgiven him, neither in this world, *neither in the world to come.*”

From this it follows, that some sins, not forgiven in this world, may be forgiven in the next; then, as none enter *heaven* burthened with sin, and none are remitted in *hell*, there must be some other place :—

1 Cor. iii. 10 to 15 : “If any man's work shall be burnt he shall suffer loss, but he himself shall be saved yet so as by fire.”

From which it follows, that, there are some sins which will not procure eternal damnation, but which will occasion

loss to the sinner; who will be saved *by fire*, whatever that may mean.

1 Pet. iii. 18, 19, 20 : " By which also he went and preached to the spirits in prison which were sometime disobedient," &c.

From which it follows, that, at the time of the death of Christ, there were souls in a state of punishment in the other world. Further, it is implied that they might be benefited, else why preach to them? Lastly, they were not in *heaven*, for that is no prison, nor in *hell*, for thence there is no escape.

Luke xii. 47 : " That servant which knew his Lord's will and prepared not himself, neither did according to his will, shall be beaten with many stripes, but he that knew not, and did commit things worthy of stripes shall be beaten with few stripes."

This implies some place where the " few stripes " may be inflicted.

2 Macc. xii. 42 : " It is therefore a holy and wholesome thought to pray for the dead that they may be loosed from their sins."

In heaven they could want no help, and in hell it would not avail them.

Matt. v. 26 : " Thou shalt not come out thence till thou has paid the uttermost farthing."

This implies that there is a time when, the uttermost farthing being paid, the prisoner shall come out.—I have merely selected these few passages for your consideration. There are many more; but I think you will admit that they seem to point to something more than heaven and hell.

EUG : I will consider them carefully; but is there any thing in the Holy Scriptures which implies or expresses that, after a person's sin is pardoned, any punishment remains? Surely our blessed Saviour's sufferings do away with all punishment for sin truly repented of?

PHIL : Certainly not; they never were intended to do so.

EUG : You surprise me.

PHIL : Nevertheless it is so. Our Saviour's sufferings were abundantly sufficient to redeem us from all punishment, as well as from the eternal consequences of sin; but it has not been the will of God to relieve even penitent

men from all punishment. For instance, *death* is the consequence of sin, part of its punishment ; so are the various evils of life, and they continue to be inflicted even upon penitent and pardoned man ; it is plain, therefore, that our Saviour's death and sufferings were not intended to relieve man from all punishment.

EUG : That view had not occurred to me ; but are there any indications in Holy Scripture of purification being necessary after pardon, and that by means of punishment ?

PHIL : There are, as well as of God's punishing sin although it has been repented of. For instance, David's sin was pardoned, but still he was punished by the death of his child ; he repented of numbering the people, but he was punished by a pestilence ; Ahab humbled himself and repented of the murder of Naboth the Jezreelite, but the punishment was not remitted, but postponed to the time of his son ; and there are many other instances. The following passages imply purification by punishment :—

Heb. xii. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 : “ Whom the Lord loveth, He chasteneth, and scourgeth every son whom He receiveth,” &c., especially the 11th verse.

2 Cor. iv. 17 : “ For our light affliction, which is for a moment, worketh out for us a far more exceeding and eternal weight of glory.”

2 Heb. x. : “ Perfect through suffering.”

THE JESUITS.

Jesuitae vero qui se maxime nobis opponunt aut necandi, aut si hoc commode fieri non potest, ejiciendi, aut certe mendaciis et calumniis opprimendi sunt."—Calvin apud Beccam, t. 1, op. 17, aph. 15.

PHILOTHEUS AND EUGENIA.

EUG: Dear Philotheus, you have, I know, a strong, and to me, unaccountable partiality for the Jesuits; will you listen to me patiently if I ask you a few questions about them?

PHIL: Most certainly, dear Eugenia, there is nothing I think which you may not know if you will, and on this subject particularly I should rejoice if I could remove even one of the many groundless prejudices which abound against them.

EUG: But why should you take up the cudgels for the Jesuits? they do not belong to our Church; what therefore have we to do with them, and why should you interest yourself about them at all?

PHIL: For two reasons chiefly; first because I believe them to be most unjustly aspersed, and my natural sense of justice revolts at the slanders I hear; and, secondly, because I believe them to be at this moment in the position of the forlorn hope of the great Christian army, and it would not only be bad policy but madness to abandon them.

EUG: I am quite aware when people are disliked how strong the tendency is to spread abroad and exaggerate their faults; but surely, dear Philotheus, there must be

something very bad about the Jesuits when we see them driven with one accord from almost every country in Europe.

PHIL: But by whom are they so driven?

EUG: By "the people," the very class of society they profess to be occupied in benefiting.

PHIL: "The people!" Who are they throughout Europe who at this time assume the name of "the people?" Are they religious people? For if not, their hostility is no great discredit.

EUG: Well, perhaps they cannot be called religious people; but still, when we see people in countries far removed from one another, with interests as various as their races, all concurring in this, that they will not tolerate the Jesuits, there must surely be a cause.

PHIL: There is a cause, dear Eugenia, and it is this: at this present time there is a turbulent spirit abroad throughout Europe, essentially democratic, immoral, and irreligious; the popular commotions are directed against monarchs, against Christian morality, and against property; the leaders are avowed infidels, and so it is that a united body like the Jesuits, who uphold order and property upon religious grounds, are hated.

EUG: Can this be so? How is it then that the clergy generally are not hated? If your explanation were true, they ought also to be hated, and for the same reason.

PHIL: The infidel mobs of Europe hate all religion and all professors of it; but they hate the Jesuits most, because, as employing themselves in education chiefly, and being a united body, their influence is more obvious, and so they attack them first.

EUG: Do you think, then, that the democratic mobs have the same distaste to all the clergy that they have to the Jesuits; are there not instances, in France for example, of great respect being shown to the parochial clergy?

PHIL: There are by numbers, who have not lost all sense of religion, by the common people, who have been, for a time only, led astray by demagogues; but there is no such feeling amongst their leaders; they hate them

all, and will show it when opportunity offers. [N.B. 1850.—Ed.]

EUG: Then you admit that at present the universal hostility I have mentioned is confined to the Jesuits?

PHIL: No, I cannot admit this; in Switzerland, two years since, they began by an attack upon the Jesuits only; within a few months every other order having anything to do with education was declared to be affiliated with the Jesuits, and expelled in like manner; and since that time, they have imprisoned the Bishop of Lausanne, who belonged to no monastic order at all, and they now threaten the whole of the parochial clergy of Friburg with banishment.

EUG: Forgive me, dear Philotheus, if I suggest that perhaps the Jesuits are to blame for this, that their faults are being visited upon the innocent.

PHIL: No doubt your suggestion is plausible; if the Jesuits are really criminal, they may have brought distaste upon religion generally by their conduct; but proof of their crimes is wanting, and I am sure you are too candid and fair to assume guilt in them, merely because the infidel democracy of Europe hates them.

EUG: You do me no more than justice; but tell me, why are the Jesuits so powerful; and, again, is it right that they should be so? Why should any body of religious men assume to have greater power, and to be of more importance than others? Perhaps this assumption is the cause of their unpopularity.

PHIL: They assume nothing; they tender themselves for the instruction of youth, and in aid of the ordinary clergy, and if they acquire the regard of the people and become influential, it is from the good they do; but in truth necessity has called them forth.

EUG: What necessity? Why could they not act as ordinary clergy, each in his own sphere, instead of binding themselves together by a vow, and allowing themselves to be used by one man at his will?

PHIL: In peaceful times they might; in a really Christian country such bodies might not be necessary; modern times, however, have taught the wicked and

turbulent the value of united action, and this it is which gives them at this time throughout Europe such power and influence as we have seen them to possess; the uncombined majority are unable to resist them; combination and united action can only be met by similar combination, and the Jesuit body, by their strict system and discipline, can and do hold the infidel phalanx in check, in a manner far more effectual than they could acting as individuals. Individual infidels may be counteracted by individual Christians; but an infidel army, trained, marshalled, and generalled, must be met by a Christian army.

EUG: You assume that the Jesuits combine for a good purpose; but this is what the world denies; they say they unite for their own selfish and ambitious purposes.

PHIL: Suppose, however, that they do unite for a good purpose, your candour will, I am sure, induce you to admit that religious combination is, in the present state of organized infidelity, justifiable.

EUG: Yes, I think I must accord you that; but, as I have already said, the world denies that the object is good.

PHIL: "The world!" it is indeed the world that denies it, for although it is too true that, in this country in particular, many good men have allowed themselves to be led away by a groundless prejudice against them, the worldly, the vicious, the irreligious are without exception to be found in the ranks of their opponents; show me a bad man, show me an infidel, show me a sensualist, show me a man indifferent to religion, and I will show you an enemy of the Jesuits, and one who will deny that their objects are good.

EUG: But are their objects good?

PHIL: Judge for yourself, dear Eugenia. How do you find them employed? In Europe and in civilized countries you find them chiefly engaged in education, uniting systematically secular learning with religion, and teaching the highest Christian morality; in heathen countries they are missionaries, sacrificing their lives for the furtherance of Christianity. Are these objects good, or are

they likely to be the objects and occupations of a bad man?

EUG: If these are their objects, of course no one can deny that they are good; but may not their motives be of a more selfish kind? for instance, ambition, and the desire to aggrandize their Order?

PHIL: Is it quite just, dear Eugenia, to suggest bad motives for good actions? If a king governs his dominions well, repressing vice and encouraging virtue, if he persists in this, in the teeth of reproaches and difficulties, should we think it fair to suppose that he acted from selfish motives alone?

EUG: No, but still it is, you must admit, a gratifying thing to feel yourself looked up to, and to know that the body of which you are a member is powerful and influential.

PHIL: No doubt it is; but if it is admitted that these men unite themselves together for the good purposes we have mentioned, we may allow them the gratification of reflecting upon the good they may have done, and of accepting the gratitude of those whom they have benefited; and, also, in the midst of trials and discouragements, of consoling themselves with the sympathy and support of their fellow-labourers in the same cause. We do not think the worse of a man's charity, because his heart may be bound at the sight of the tear of gratitude.

EUG: Well, assuming that they have really been occupied in doing good, perhaps it is but fair to allow them the sweets; but suppose my suggestion to be true, that their one great motive is the aggrandizement of their Order, that surely is an unworthy motive, and may account for their unpopularity.

PHIL: I cannot admit that the aggrandizement of their Order is necessarily a bad or unworthy motive; that depends upon the object for which they seek its aggrandizement; if they desire its aggrandizement to enable it to act more effectually for good, that is not an evil desire; but if they desire it to serve their own interests, of course I admit it to be bad. You must judge of their desire of aggrandizing their society by the use they intend to make of it.

EUG: Well then, all seems to depend upon the goodness or badness of the objects which the Jesuits have in view: if they are occupied in teaching and doing good, and, as you aver, in checking and contending with a combined body of infidels, they cannot be blamed for making their body as efficient as possible, nor is it to be wondered at that those whom they oppose should hate them; but it is alleged against them that they hold and teach evil doctrine, and corrupt morals.

PHIL: By whom is this alleged? Chiefly by notorious infidel writers, philosophers of the Voltaire school, who are bitterly angry that they can obtain no such influence as that which religious teachers obtain, and again, by mere novel and romance writers.

EUG: But, dear Philotheus, these allegations are not confined to such persons; there are writers in our own country, whom you, I am sure, would not call infidels, who proclaim loudly that the Jesuit system is an immoral one, and when we find such men as these confirming and repeating the same stories, it gives them, to say the least, some degree of probability.

PHIL: I doubt whether any of these men (whose honesty of purpose I am far from disputing) speak from their own knowledge. Those who detail these stories are chiefly persons having a very strong prejudice against the Catholic system altogether, and therefore against the Jesuits as being active propagators of it; they are in general, men, I should hope above the invention of falsehoods, but not above the temptation of retailing stories upon insufficient evidence which tend to confirm their preconceptions, and which if true would be proofs of the correctness of their judgment in regard to the whole body. Trace one of these stories, and you will find it either a gross exaggeration, or utterly without foundation. I have done so in more than one instance, and my inquiry has always cleared the Jesuits.

EUG: What are the kind of stories you say you have traced? Of course the Jesuits themselves would deny them.

PHIL: Well, if you will not think it too long, I will

tell you a story which I heard openly told at a dinner-table within the last twelvemonth by the Rev. Mr. Coldwell, Rector of Stafford. (1850.)

EUG: Do not fear tiring me—I should like to hear it.

PHIL: I must first however premise, that, in general, these retailers of stories against the Jesuits do not condescend to particulars; their tales are generally singularly free from dates, names, and localities, so that it is impossible to prove them false; but in the present case the particulars were so precise, and the parties so well known, that though the story on that account was at once adopted and believed by those present, except myself, it enabled me to trace it.

EUG: Well now for the story.

PHIL: The Rev. Peter French is the Vicar of Burton-upon-Trent, on the borders of Staffordshire; he had, some short time since, a curate, recommended to him from a quarter from which he could suspect no fraud; the curate came, was engaged, and proved himself an active and zealous man; he visited the poor, he worked at the schools, and obtained a good opinion of all. The Squire of the Parish was Mr. Matthew Gisborne, with whom the Vicar was intimate; one day the Squire met the Vicar, and congratulated him upon having obtained so excellent a curate, and begged him to take an opportunity of introducing him, the Squire, to the new curate, which the Vicar promised to do. Shortly afterwards, the Squire took occasion to invite the Vicar to dinner, including the new curate in the invitation. On the day appointed, the Vicar drove out to the Squire's house accompanied by the curate, and on their way they discussed various religious questions, the Vicar being more than ever pleased with his acquisition. They arrived, the usual salutations passed between the Squire and the Vicar, but, to the great surprise of the Vicar, it was obvious that the Squire and the curate had met before, and that the recognition was not agreeable to either: the curate especially, instead of being cheerful and conversible as he usually was, was reserved and confused. The dinner was at last over, when the Squire requested the Vicar to

retire with him into his study; when alone the following conversation took place: "Do you know whom you have brought here?" "No, except that he is Mr. —, my curate, whom you asked me to bring; it seems you know him." "I do and he knows me. I knew him at Florence, where we met constantly, and I shall surprise you when I tell you that he is neither more nor less than a Jesuit priest in disguise."

EUG: Well, it is a most extraordinary story, but not unlike other stories I have heard about Jesuits insinuating themselves into society in disguise.

PHIL: That is very probable, and perhaps they are all equally true. At all events, I determined not to lose so fair an opportunity of testing a specific story, so applied through a friend to the Rev. Peter French, Vicar of Burton, and saw his letter in reply, in which he assured our mutual friend that the whole circumstances, from beginning to end, were entirely without foundation so far as he was concerned, and that he had never heard of them before. Shortly after this, I saw the Squire, Mr. Matthew Gisborne, personally, and received his assurance that nothing of the kind had ever occurred to him, so that some one must have deliberately invented the story to serve the purpose of maligning the Jesuits.*

EUG: Such falsehoods are no doubt most disgraceful to those who invent them, but there are so many stories of this kind, that it is scarcely possible but that some of them must be true.

PHIL: There are few so specific as this; most of them are like the story of the butcher-boy, without names, and so incapable of contradiction.

EUG: The butcher-boy! what story is that?

PHIL: One told openly in the presence of my informant, by a well-known writer, in the Common Room of E—— College; it was simply this: A gentleman (not named) who had lived much abroad and had seen and received civilities from many foreign ecclesiastics, was walking in London, and saw in a butcher's shop (the street

* That such tales are not a thing of the past, witness the late fiction in November, 1891, about Lord Salisbury's Jesuit butler.—E. B.

not named), a shopman with his blue apron and steel, looking out for customers; he thought he remembered the face, and passed the shop once or twice to endeavour to recall it, when at once it flashed upon him that it was a Jesuit priest whom he had known abroad. He entered the shop, addressed the man by name, but he put on an air of surprise, and denied being the person he was supposed to be. The gentleman, however, reiterated the certainty he felt that it was his Jesuit friend, and at last the man admitted it, and begged the gentleman not to betray him.

EUG: Your friend heard this story told?

PHIL: He did, and it was told as an illustration of the pains the Jesuits took to insinuate themselves into all classes of society for their own secret purposes, and that by a gentleman who would be deemed good authority, and who certainly would not have told a story which he did not himself believe.

EUG: Do you think there was any truth in it?

PHIL: Not a word.

EUG: How then do you account for such a person as you describe believing it?

PHIL: He was a person with strong prejudices against the Jesuits, and this led him eagerly to grasp at any story to their discredit without his usual caution.

EUG: You did not try to test this story?

PHIL: I could not; no names or localities were mentioned.

EUG: But other stories are told respecting their books; they are said to contain false morality; for instance, that the end justifies the means, that they may and must commit mortal sin at the command of their Superior, &c. Now, the books, of course, speak for themselves.

PHIL: They do, fortunately; and those who are best versed in them, though opponents, admit that no such doctrines are to be found there. Of all the passages which I have seen quoted in proof of these and similar charges, there is not one which will bear the construction put upon it.

EUG: I am afraid, dear Philotheus, I shall tire you with my objections.

PHIL: Never fear tiring me, you cannot possibly gratify me more than by giving me so deliberate an opportunity of explaining myself on this or any other subject.

EUG: Well, then, I suppose it is true that all Jesuits take a vow of obedience to the General of the Order, and also to their immediate Superiors. Can it be right for any set of men to convert themselves into mere machines, acting and moving at the will of another?

PHIL: That depends upon the object with which they so bind themselves; if their object be such that it cannot be effectually accomplished without united action, the vow insures it, whereas without such vow or promise, each might act according to his own judgment, and the advantage of united action would be lost.

EUG: Surely they might act together without a vow: the vow seems to me to deprive a man of his individuality as well as of his responsibility; if what he undertakes to do is right, he does not require a vow to induce him to do it; if it is wrong, he ought not to vow it.

PHIL: Vows are merely solemn promises, and have ever been used in Christian times. A husband and wife vow fidelity to each other; no office of any importance in this country is ever confided to any one, without an oath or vow that he will perform its duties; so it is not in our mouths to say that vows are wrong in themselves. Again, the vow of a Jesuit is merely that he will obey his Superior in all things lawful. No army could exist without similar obedience through all the gradations of rank; the General of the Jesuits is not more absolute than the general of an army, nor so much so; a soldier must put a man to death at the command of his general.

EUG: I see that implicit obedience is necessary in a soldier because the lives of thousands may depend upon it; but is it equally so in the case of a monk?

PHIL: If you admit that united action is desirable to check and counteract the combinations of the wicked, it is quite as important to secure it by implicit obedience in a body of Jesuits as in an army; the contest between the parties relates to a matter quite as important as men's lives.

EUG: Well, but there is another point; if it be so obvious, as you seem to think it, that the establishment of the Jesuits is advantageous, nay, necessary, how has it happened that the Popes themselves have differed upon the subject, at one time establishing, at another dissolving, and then again re-establishing the Order?

PHIL: The existence of a specially united body of men like the Jesuits is not necessarily permanent—it may be a temporary necessity, it may be called out like an army for an existing emergency. Again, it is sometimes advisable to keep an army on foot even after its immediate object is accomplished; at other times it may be desirable to raise it, now to disband it, now to raise it again; it is not essential to the Church system that such a body should be perpetual.

EUG: But still, I have always heard it quoted as an instance of the inconsistency of the Church of Rome, that at one time it establishes the Jesuits and at another suppresses them.

PHIL: Such a representation is absurd; it might with equal propriety be said that a king, who raises an army, uses it, disbands it, and raises it again, is inconsistent.

EUG: But we are led to expect more uniformity of action in Popes than in ordinary monarchs—they claim to be infallible.

PHIL: Uniformity of action in opposite states of circumstances would not be true uniformity; the varying circumstances of the world may render it desirable at this time to dismiss, at that time to establish an order, and the Pope who suppresses, cannot be said to disagree with the Pope who establishes, when the circumstances of the time might have been different.

EUG: But were they different?

PHIL: They were: but even if they were not, discretionary arrangements of this sort are not matters upon which Popes claim to be infallible, but this is too important a matter to be discussed casually.

EUG: Well then, you seem altogether to side with the Jesuits against the general voice of Europe, as well as of our own Church.

PHIL: Putting aside all notorious infidels, and turbulent political agitators, whose opinions you will admit ought not to weigh at all, I do not believe that the voice of Europe is against them, and as to our own Church, I do not know that she has ever raised her voice against the Jesuits, although they have heretofore been grievously persecuted by her members.

EUG: This however you must admit, that the great majority of those we meet in our own country would be found arranged against them, and many whom I am sure you would not consider as bad men.

PHIL: I admit it with sorrow; it is one of the unfavourable signs of our condition, but I must think that the most bitter opponents of the Jesuits in this country would somewhat slacken in their hostility, if they would but contemplate the characters and opinions of the men who are heading the attack, and hounding on the wolves of Europe upon their prey. Can there be any object in common between the good men you speak of and Michelet, Eugene Sue, and the infidel route of Parisian novelists, or again with Guerazzi, Mazzini, and the murderers of Rossi at Rome?

EUG: May they not hate the Jesuits for a bad reason and we for a good reason?

PHIL: Certainly, but do not deceive yourself, dear Eugenia: both parties hate them for the same reason.

EUG: What is that?

PHIL: The works which they do; and if those works are hated by the bad, if they displease and enrage the wicked, it deserves consideration whether they can be far from good.

EUG: Well, dear Philotheus, I am not sorry to have had this conversation with you; I will think of what you have said, but you must not be angry with me if I do not at once agree with you.

PHIL: I do not expect to remove long existing prejudices at once, but pray do think of what I have said, and let me repeat that I believe the Jesuit body to be: *the forlorn hope of the Christian army, having an enemy in front who gives no quarter, and fired upon by those, who should be their comrades, in the rear.*

THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND OUR MOTHER.

PHILOTHEUS AND EUGENIA.

EUG: The Church of England is our spiritual mother; she has, indeed, been grievously maltreated and neglected by those whose duty it was to have cherished and protected her, and her fair face may have been deformed, yet, and for that very reason, so long as there is life in her, a good son would never forsake her.

PHIL: The world is apt to be unduly carried away by figures or similes; yours, in which you compare our national Church to a mother, is an affecting one, but it will not bear examination.

EUG: Why?—is not the Church our mother in a very real sense? were we not spiritually born in her? and if we were, do not the duties of a son attach to us in regard to her, as they would in regard to a natural mother?

PHIL: In the first place, can a man have more than one mother?

EUG: No; I think I may admit that.

PHIL: Well then, the Holy Catholic Church is your mother, of which the Church of England, if a part, is only a small part; she cannot, therefore, be your mother also; she may have been your nurse, and in that capacity may claim your regard and respect, and even your love, always, however, in subordination to that allegiance, veneration and affection which we all owe to the Catholic Church.

EUG: The Church of England is that part of the Church with which only I have had to do; my love and veneration has necessarily been attracted to what my eyes have seen; and not to an abstraction which I cannot see.

PHIL: You can scarcely call the Catholic Church an abstraction, as you may look in her face wherever you may be; I might ask you whether you have been attracted to what I may call your step-mother by features peculiar to herself, or by some faint resemblance she retains of the beauty of your real mother, but tell me, do you think the county of Lancaster has any claim upon your loyalty as against the whole kingdom of which it forms a part?

EUG: No, but the Church of England is not like a county, a county is not a complete systematic whole in itself, as the Church of England is; a county has numberless relations towards other parts of the kingdom, and is not independent and distinct; the Church of England, on the other hand, is complete within itself, and has no necessary relations with anything without it. You must admit that this is a wide distinction.

PHIL: It is so, but suppose the county of Lancaster should declare itself independent, and cut off all connection with the rest of the empire: to which would your loyalty be due—to the separated county or to the whole empire?

EUG: That would depend upon circumstances; if the county of Lancaster had been suffering from the tyranny of the rest of the empire, if it had been misgoverned and oppressed, and had therefore separated itself, it is probable I should hold to the county of Lancaster; it would be there that I should see in operation those institutions which, under more favourable circumstances, would have been the ground of my attachment to the whole empire.

PHIL: I understand you; but suppose the local authorities in Lancashire, instead of exhibiting to you the ancient institutions of your country in their purity, had neglected and corrupted them: if they had so far deformed them that they could scarcely be recognized, should you think it your duty to adhere to the separated county, and give all your love and veneration to her, on the ground that there was still some little good remaining, some portions of the old laws and habits of the empire?

EUG : Well, I cannot think the cases are similar.

PHIL : Then we need not carry the consideration of this point farther at present, but I have another objection to your simile.

EUG : What is that?

PHIL : There are two periods in the existence of a natural mother, one, in which she nourishes, instructs, and protects her offspring; another, in which such services being no longer necessary, she herself, in her turn, requires protection and support; she passes from the period of youth and strength, to that of age and decrepitude; the Church knows no such change, and if any supposed part of the Church has ceased to nourish, instruct, and protect those committed to her care, to the same extent it ceases to deserve our respect or adhesion. The simile, there, of holding on to your spiritual mother so long as life remains in her, will not hold, because there are probably no heretical bodies in the world which have not retained some portion of Divine Truth, or may not exhibit signs of vitality.

EUG : I am not prepared to follow you into so minute an examination of the simile, but I cannot divest myself of the feeling that the Church which has brought me up has a title to my adhesion and respect.

PHIL : The Church has; but no one part of the Church has a right to claim this adhesion as against the great body of the Church; you yourself would not say that the diocese of Chester has a greater claim to your adherence than the whole Church of England.

EUG : Certainly not, but then the diocese of Chester is only a subordinate part of the Church of England.

PHIL : And so the Church of England is only a subordinate part of the whole Catholic Church.

EUG : A co-ordinate part, I should say.

PHIL : Well, a co-ordinate part if you will, but then Chester is equally a co-ordinate part of the Church of England; as the diocese of Chester is to the Church of England, so is the Church of England to the whole Church.

EUG : But the Church of England is independent of

the rest of the Church, while Chester is not independent of the Church of England.

PHIL: But how came the Church of England to be independent of the rest of the Church; who made her independent?

EUG: She made herself independent and declares that no foreign prelate hath any authority within the realm of England.

PHIL: Could the diocese of Chester make itself independent of the rest of the Church of England?

EUG: No, certainly not.

PHIL: May I ask, why not?

EUG: Because Chester is but a part of the kingdom of England, with which the Church of England is co-extensive.

PHIL: I should have thought that Christ's body, the Church, was designed to over-ride the petty and variable distinction of Civil Governments; you know England was once a heptarchy and may hereafter be two; is our loyalty and attachment to the Church of Christ to be alternately compressed into a small locality, and enlarged into an empire in accordance with the treaties or usurpations of monarchs or the successful outbreaks of rebels?

EUG: But Chester at present is part of an existing Church, and as such cannot act without the concurrence of the body of which it forms part.

PHIL: But suppose, rightly or wrongly, the Bishop and Clergy of the diocese of Chester did separate themselves, and suppose they altered the articles, prayers and sacraments in that diocese, making them in some important respects quite different from those of the Church of England, and discordant with them, should you think it your duty to adhere to the Church of Chester because she was your spiritual mother?

EUG: No,—if the Church of Chester altered important matters of doctrine, of course that would deprive her of all claims on me.

PHIL: But you said you would not quit your spiritual mother, in consequence of some few faults, if she still retained life in her? some true doctrines and men of blameless lives?

EUG: But I do not consider the Church of Chester as my spiritual mother: she is merely that portion of the Church of England entrusted with my education; the Church of England is my mother, not the Church of Chester.

PHIL: Can you find any better simile for the Church of Chester than that she is or was your nurse or tutor?

EUG: I do not know that I can.

PHIL: Well, in like manner, I consider that the Church England having been, as it were, entrusted with your education by the Catholic Church, is no more than your nurse or tutor, and, if she ceased to teach you according to the will of your mother, would cease to have any right to your adhesion.

March, 1849.

IMITATION OF CATHOLIC PRACTICES.

PHILOTHEUS AND EUGENIA.

EUG : I think, dear Philotheus, if you will allow me to say so, you do not feel the same satisfaction at the introduction of Catholic practices into the English services as you used to do ; formerly any approximation to the forms and practices of the Catholic Church was pleasing to you ; now it seems to be indifferent, if not distasteful ;—am I right in supposing that this is so ?

PHIL : It certainly is distasteful.

EUG : Can you tell me how you explain the apparent change in your sympathies ?

PHIL : My sympathies have not changed.

EUG : How then do you account for your now disliking or being indifferent to what heretofore you liked, and were even anxious to promote ?

PHIL : In old times, at Margaret Chapel, the imitations of Catholic ceremonies and practices, though few, were the imitations of sympathy and regard, involving respect and reverence for the body imitated ; at present, the imitations, though much more extensive, look like the imitations of rivalry and opposition, existing with a considerable degree of jealousy and ill-will.

EUG : What reason can you have for saying that there is more jealousy or ill-will now against the Catholics than there was in the old times you speak of, by which I suppose you mean, Oakeley's time ?

PHIL : Many men became Catholics in Oakeley's time, but I never heard him speak disparagingly of them on that account ; but since he became a Catholic, I have heard his successors speak disparagingly of him.

EUG : Perhaps they had reason.

PHIL : I have heard their reasons, and they are not sufficient to justify them.

EUG : But to return to our first point : whatever may

be the motives of those who introduce them, I do not see why you should not be equally pleased at the introduction of Catholic practices now as formerly.

PHIL: I am equally pleased with the practices, but not with the use that is made of them. I may admire an avowed quotation, but not an unavowed plagiarism. To imitate a man in friendship is honourable, to imitate him in order to supplant him is shabby; it is not only dressing in borrowed plumes, but doing so in order to outshine the true owner.

EUG: But the persons to whom you now allude would not admit that they are borrowing anything; they would say that all their practices belong legitimately to the Anglican system.

PHIL: If they do nothing but carry out carefully what legitimately belongs to the Anglican system, no one has a right to find fault, certainly I should not; they may do this, and at the same time oppose the Catholics; it is only when Anglicans step beyond their own system to borrow practices peculiarly Catholic, that enmity to Catholicism becomes inconsistent and their imitation dishonest.

EUG: You make a distinction between practices legitimately belonging to the English Church and practices peculiarly Catholic; can you specify more particularly what you mean?

PHIL: The daily service, the chanting, the solemn offertory, the candlesticks on the Altar, the frequent communions,—all these may be said to be a fair carrying out of the system as it appears in the Anglican prayer-book, but the construction of piscinæ, the use of cruets, instead of a flagon, the mixing water with the wine in the chalice, the imitation of the attitudes and positions of the Catholic Mass, the shaping the surplice to look like an alb, the Master of Arts' hood to look like a chasuble, and the scarf to look like a stole, are, as it seems to me, departures from the Anglican system, and if adopted, should only be adopted concurrently with respect for the body imitated.

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